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EXPLOITING THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTION’S
HYPERSALIENCE
Eric S. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
For all the varied opinions on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 20171 (“TCJA”),
tax pundits would generally agree that this Act is the most substantial federal tax
reform in 30 years2 and has made tax law more salient. That is to say, it is reasonable
to suggest (at least anecdotally) that individuals are now more aware of certain tax
provisions, and perhaps the way the tax laws operate generally, than they were
before.3 At least for November and December of 2017, terms like “standard
deduction” and “personal exemption” enjoyed a stint in the mainstream news cycle.4
This Article suggests that market distortions attributable to hypersalience do not rise
to a level that requires affirmative congressional correction. Moreover, this Article
suggests that concerns of constitutionally worrisome burdens on speech,
overregulation, and a less viable charities sector outweigh concerns associated with
behavior driven by taxpayer cognitive error in connection with the actual
deductibility of charitable donations.

*
© 2020 Eric S. Smith. Associate Professor of Taxation and Associate Dean, John B.
Goddard School of Business & Economics, Weber State University, Ogden, UT. For
comments and critical feedback on this Article, I thank Hayes Holderness, Edward
McCaffrey, Gladriel Shobe, and Darcie Costello. Thanks to the editors and staff of the Utah
Law Review for their exceptional editorial work. I dedicate this article to my mom, Elaine
Smith.
1
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (Supp. 2017).
2
WILLIAM G. GALE ET AL., URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR, EFFECTS OF THE TAX
CUTS AND JOBS ACT: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 1 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/ES_20180608_tcja_summary_paper_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6
L5Z-THG6].
3
In its monthly survey on Consumer Confidence shortly after the promulgation of the
TCJA, Forbes reported that of 7,500 Americans surveyed, 54% were aware of the new tax
reform. Gary Drenik, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Begins to Have Positive Impact on Spending
Intentions, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinsights
/2018/03/19/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-begins-to-have-positive-impact-on-spending-intentions
/#1efc41b3f984 [https://perma.cc/5KKC-MTSK].
4
See, e.g., Alicia Parlapiano, The Five Biggest Changes for Families Proposed in the
Republican Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2017, at A14; Richard Rubin, GOP Bets on a
Simpler Tax Code, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2017, at A1; Russ Wiles, With Tax Reform Pending,
It’s Time to Consider Actions Now, USA TODAY, Dec. 15, 2017, at 3b.
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Consider the deduction for state and local taxes paid as an example.5 This
provision made headlines6 when a senate bill proposed wholesale abandonment of
the deduction.7 The $10,000 deduction cap that eventually emerged as law8
represents a tax provision of which many are now more aware (even as their
awareness is tinged with gloom in many state and local tax-heavy “blue states”).9
Yet salience10 (to whatever extent it exists) in this context has a shelf life; it
erodes with the passage of time. Without constant reinforcement, especially when
considering something as uninviting to understand as the tax law, general awareness
would seem to diminish as tax reform becomes old news. Moreover, even if salience
could be maintained, the passage of time notwithstanding, it would last only so long
as the tax law remained static. For at least two reasons, permanency is not likely to
be a hallmark of the most recent tax reform. First, most of the TCJA’s changes with
respect to individuals statutorily sunset at the end of 2025.11 Second, on a broader
5

See I.R.C. § 164(a) (Supp. 2017).
See, e.g., Kenneth R. Harney, Portions of Senate Tax Bill Are Harsher on
Homeowners than the House Proposal, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/portions-of-senate-tax-bill-are-harsher-on-hom
eowners-than-the-house-proposal/2017/11/14/9bb04aec-c8b6-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d_
story.html?utm_term=.6b85077193c3 [https://perma.cc/KU2L-HSJ2].
7
S. 1, 115th Cong. § 11042 (2017).
8
Pub. L. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054, 2085–86 (2017) (codified at I.R.C. §
164(b)(6)(B) (Supp. 2017).
9
If the federal state and local tax deduction is now capped, see I.R.C. § 164(a)-(b),
taxpayers in states with high state and local taxes will not be able to deduct the full amount
of those taxes. States with high state and local taxes tend to be blue states. John S. Kiernan,
2019 Tax Rates by State, WALLETHUB (Mar. 12, 2019), https://wallethub.com/edu/bestworst-states-to-be-a-taxpayer/2416/#red-vs-blue [https://perma.cc/CD5A-GRB5]; see also
Ben Casselman & Jeffery C. Mays, Last-Minute Rush to Prepay Taxes Gives Way to
Confusion and Anger, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/
business/economy/irs-prepay-property-tax.html [https://perma.cc/2J4X-KC4M].
10
Use of the term “salience” here is in its most general sense: a reference to “visibility
or prominence.” Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28
YALE J. ON REG. 253, 254 (2011). This Article’s working definition of salience is informed
by Schenk, as well as Gamage and Shanske, who distinguish market/economic salience from
political salience. See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience:
Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 20 (2011). Market/economic
salience “refers to how tax presentation affects market decisions and economic activity.” Id.
“Political salience refers to how tax presentation affects voting behavior and political
outcomes.” Id. As discussed infra Part IV, these definitions differ from that of some other
scholars who define “salience” more narrowly to focus on perception or understanding,
rather than simply general awareness.
11
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 164(b)(6)(B) (Supp. 2017). This and nearly all of the TCJA’s tax
cuts relating to individuals will expire on December 31, 2025. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N,
LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS 2016–2027, at 15–17 (2018). The
Congressional Budget Resolution “allows for up to $1.5 trillion in net tax cuts over 10 years
through the filibuster-proof process of reconciliation.” Patrick Louis Knudsen, Estimating
6
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level, Rebecca Kysar and Linda Sugin believe that the TCJA is plagued with
instability and has created a system that will not last.12 They suggest that the partisan
way that Republican Party leaders chose to strong-arm the legislation through
Congress, without a single Democrat’s support, undermined the law’s likelihood of
long-term survival.13
Like the deduction for state and local taxes paid, the TCJA also affected the
deductibility of charitable contributions, though in a less direct way.14 The TCJA
increased the standard deduction to $24,000 for joint return filers and $12,000 for
single filers.15 It also suspended the personal exemption until 2026.16
The expansion of the standard deduction17 and the suspension of the personal
exemption caught the attention of media outlets for the effect these provisions would
have on charitable giving.18 With such an expansive standard deduction, one
the Effects of Tax Reform, 2 HOUSE BUDGET COMM. 13 (Nov. 7, 2017), https://republicansbudget.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/13-Scoring-Tax-Reform-column.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3668-FQLX]. Making provisions affecting individuals permanent would
have exceeded this limitation.
12
Rebecca M. Kysar & Linda Sugin, Opinion, The Tax Bill’s Built-In Instability, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2017, at A27.
13
See id. As rationale for this conclusion, Kysar and Sugin note that the law could
change as quickly as when Congressional controls shifts to the Democrats again. See id. They
note that this “dynamic is worsened by the fact that the tax legislation pits blue states against
red through the limitation of the state and local tax deductions.” Id. They further cite the fact
that corporate tax relief was deep and permanent, while individual relief was temporary and
modest, that the law increases the deficit, and that international provisions may violate World
Trade Agreements as additional signs of instability and factors that may limit the TCJA’s
survival. Id.
14
The TCJA also increased the limitation on cash contributions to public charities from
50% to 60%, beginning after 2017 and before 2026. Pub. L. 115-97, § 11021, 131 Stat. 2054,
2074–75 (2017) (codified at I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(G) (Supp. 2017)).
15
Pub. L. 115-97, § 11021, 131 Stat. 2054, 2074–75 (2017) (codified at I.R.C. §
63(c)(7)(A) (Supp. 2017)) (increasing the standard deduction and requiring that this amount
is indexed for inflation).
16
Pub. L. 115-97, § 11041(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2082 (2017) (codified at I.R.C. § 151(d)
(Supp. 2017)).
17
The amount of the standard deduction will be indexed for inflation using Chained
Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers in tax years beginning after 2018. I.R.C. §
63(c)(7)(B) (Supp. 2017). Increased standard deduction amounts will expire after Dec. 31,
2025. Id. §63(c)(7).
18
See, e.g., Laura Saunders, Winners and Losers in Tax Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28,
2017, at B1; Darla Mercado, Tax Reform: Families will feel the pain of losing this break,
USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2017, 2:49 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/taxes/2017
/12/20/tax-reform-families-feel-pain-losing-break/970385001/
[https://perma.cc/HJ2UP5JJ]; Richard Rubin, Tax Bill to Have Uneven Effect on Households, Study Says, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 7, 2017, 12:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/majority-would-benefit-fromtax-bill-but-effects-peter-out-study-says-1510074698
[https://perma.cc/8TZS-UM7X];
Republicans Unveil a Tax Plan at Last, ECONOMIST (Sept. 30, 2017),
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nonprofit spokesperson publicly lamented that many taxpayers would no longer
have a tax incentive to give.19 This seems very likely true, as it will be more difficult
for taxpayers to cobble together enough itemized deductions (e.g., medical expenses,
state and local taxes paid subject to $10,000 limit, home mortgage interest paid, and
more relevantly charitable giving) to surpass the more generous standard deduction
amounts.20 Therefore, these taxpayers will likely choose the standardized deduction,
rather than itemization, in order to obtain the maximize deduction.
This new awareness potentially undermines a phenomenon that Lillian
Faulhaber observed in relation to the charitable contribution deduction.21 She
identified and introduced the concept of “hypersalience,” to describe the cognitive
error that occurs when taxpayers are highly aware of a tax provision generally but
fail to correctly perceive its associated limitations.22 The charitable contribution
deduction—a revenue-reducing tax provision which on its face is fully, or almost
fully, salient, but which harbors limitations that are hidden, or at least less salient—
was Faulhaber’s prime example.23
Faulhaber focused on the interplay between the deductibility of charitable
donations and the standard deduction.24 She suggested that because the charitable
contribution deduction is limited to taxpayers who itemize deductions, “its salience
to all taxpayers may be misleading.”25 With the promulgation of the TCJA, the
limiting influence of the standard deduction has been amplified and cast into the
spotlight.26 Ostensibly, more taxpayers should now be aware that the tax benefit for
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/09/30/republicans-unveil-a-tax-plan-at-last
[https://perma.cc/H5GR-T3H3].
19
See Bryan McQueeney, Op-Ed, The GOP Tax Reform Will Devastate Charitable
Giving, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oemcqueeney-charitable-giving-under-new-tax-law-20171227-story.html [http://perma.cc/3U
2N-3VAG].
20
Taxpayers may take the standard deduction, a statutory amount indexed for inflation
and driven by the taxpayer’s filing status in the calculation of taxable income, or they may
itemize their deductions. See I.R.C. § 63(b), (c) (Supp. 2017). Itemized deductions are
available for, inter alia, medical expenses, state and local taxes paid, certain interest paid,
and for charitable donations. Id. at §§ 63(d), 163, 164, 170, 213. Assuming a taxpayer is
eligible for both, she will choose the greater of the two amounts to maximize tax benefit.
21
Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction: An Introduction
to Hypersalience, 92 B.U.L. REV. 1307, 1317–20 (2012).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 1309, 1318–28.
24
Id. at 1320–21.
25
Id. at 1322.
26
It should be noted that hypersalience, as Faulhaber defines it, likely still exists. In the
early years in which the TCJA applies, it seems improbable that many taxpayers will have
followed the tax reform narrative closely enough to determine that their charitable giving
will not likely be deductible. Some taxpayers may have previously itemized and undertaken
charitable giving annually. Thus, in meaningful ways, hypersalience still accurately
describes the cognitive state of a critical mass of taxpayers.
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charitable giving will be limited and available only to substantial charitable donors
and/or those who mix a cocktail with the other itemized deductions and charitable
giving.27 Yet this awareness will, on the face of the legislation, only be accurate for
a limited period of time.28
The sunset provisions by which the standard deduction will revert to its preTCJA levels in 202629 should, in theory, reinvigorate the charitable contribution
deduction as a viable tax incentive and make it financially appealing to more
taxpayers.30 Perhaps even sooner, given the instability that could ensue if the
pendulum of political power makes its return stroke to the Democrats in an
upcoming election,31 future tax reform could incentivize charitable giving by
(among other measures) affirmatively lowering the standard deduction amounts to
make deductions for charitable donations financially appealing to more taxpayers.
In either case, hypersalience with respect to charitable giving will likely permeate
the cognitive perception of the American taxpayer once more, perhaps even at preTCJA levels, as sunsets or affirmative legislative repeals obfuscate the granular
details of deducting charitable donations.
Consider, for example, the media response that would follow if a Democratcontrolled Congress affirmatively lowered the standard deduction to pre-TCJA
levels before the sunset provisions apply at the end of 2025. Journalists would likely
play up the angle that more taxpayers now have a financial incentive to donate to
charity, though this characterization would be incomplete and still inaccurate for
many. Hypersalience in relation to the charitable contribution deduction would
almost surely follow.32
27
See generally Alyssa A. DiRusso, Charity at Work: Proposing a Charitable Flexible
Spending Account, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 281, 287 (2014) (explaining that roughly two-thirds
of taxpayers take the standard deduction, rather than itemizing); Faulhaber, supra note 21, at
1322–23 (discussing the disparity between the amount of charitable donations made and the
lower amount of charitable donations claimed in itemized tax deductions).
28
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1(j) (Supp. 2017); JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 11, at 15–
17.
29
Pub. L. 115-97, § 11021, 131 Stat. 2054, 2074–75 (2017) (codified at I.R.C. §
63(c)(7) (Supp. 2017)).
30
See discussion infra Section IV.B.; see also DiRusso, supra note 27, at 298
(“[M]etrics generally suggest that the charitable deduction does in fact incentivize charitable
giving and quantitatively increase taxpayer giving behavior among those who qualify for the
deduction.”).
31
Laura Davison, Trump’s Tax Cuts Could Die the Hard Way: A Little at a Time,
BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2019, 1:47 PM MDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-06-18/trump-s-tax-cuts-could-die-the-hard-way-a-little-at-a-time [https://perma.cc/
BY6H-2KB3].
32
This is not to suggest that the TCJA has made the limitations on the deductibility of
charitable giving fully salient. It would be foolhardy to suggest that the lead-up to and fallout from the TCJA, and its associated media coverage, were sufficient to bring all taxpayers
to a full level of awareness with respect to the mutual exclusivity between tax benefit from
charitable giving and the standard deduction. This paper moves forward on the suppositions
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This Article considers the appropriate congressional reaction to hypersalience
through two lenses. The first is market, or economic salience. Lillian Faulhaber’s
introduction of hypersalience, as illustrated through the charitable contribution
deduction, includes a policy recommendation: Congress should take affirmative
steps to minimize or mitigate hypersalience.33 Her argument is based exclusively on
the effects hypersalience appears to have on market behavior.34 This Article is a
rejoinder to Faulhaber’s position and suggests that market distortions attributable to
hypersalience do not rise to a level that requires affirmative congressional
correction. Moreover, this Article suggests that concerns about constitutionally
worrisome burdens on speech, overregulation, and a less viable charities sector
outweigh concerns associated with behavior driven by taxpayer cognitive error in
connection with the actual deductibility of charitable donations.
The second element of salience this Article considers is political salience.
Deborah Schenk writes in favor of exploiting political salience in the context of
hidden or low-salience taxes.35 Her rationale stems, in part, from the American
taxpayer’s adverseness to tax increases but general support of government programs.
Combined, this willingness to play but not pay mentality gives rise to budget
shortfalls. Schenk contends that a viable and cogent argument can be made in favor
of low salience or hidden taxes that prevent American taxpayers from fully
appreciating their incidence of tax.36 This Article applies Schenk’s argument in favor
of exploiting salience, and gauges whether similar logic applies in favor of
exploiting hypersalience. This Article finds that Congress, facing an utterly taxaverse electorate, can ill-afford to expend political capital to correct the cognitive
misperception of tax deductions (which could be perceived as new taxes), when it
would give rise to no additional revenues.
The first three parts of this Article assimilate the literature and set the
foundation to determine whether a viable argument exists for the exploitation of
hypersalience. They comment upon, but are more than recitations of, prior studies;
they dissect and elaborate. The combined narrative is meant to weave the literature
together to provide a clear context with respect to the arguments made in this Article.
Part II distinguishes salience and hypersalience and reaffirms the notion that
low salience taxes and hypersalient tax deductions are functional equivalents. Part
III examines Schenk’s normative argument for the exploitation of political
salience—an argument stemming from the citizenry’s utterly incompatible desire
that: 1) the TCJA affected the charitable contribution deduction’s hypersalient character, but
by no means did it completely resolve it; and 2) that hypersalience will reemerge with more
force over time.
33
Faulhaber, supra note 21, at 1345–46.
34
See generally id. (introducing the concept of hypersalience with an overview of
behavior economics in tax literature).
35
See generally Schenk, supra note 10 (arguing the use of low-salience tax provisions
may in fact be democracy-enhancing including a case study demonstrating the use lowsalience tax provisions is justified and effective).
36
Id. at 281.
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for more government-provided goods and services but less taxes. Schenk tightly
frames her argument for exploitation of salience within conditions of transparency
and availability. The process by which low-salience taxes are promulgated should
be reasonably transparent, and knowledge of the low-salience provisions themselves
should be accessible if a taxpayer seeks them out.37
Part IV revisits Faulhaber’s use of the charitable contribution deduction as an
example of hypersalience. This analysis goes beyond the four corners of Faulhaber’s
paper and attempts to reconcile the findings of a subsequent study by Goldin and
Listokin38 that seems to undermine Faulhaber’s anecdotal determinations related to
hypersalience. Ultimately, this discussion distinguishes Faulhaber’s and Goldin and
Listokin’s studies on their disparate definitions of the term hypersalience and
confirms Faulhaber’s assumptions related to taxpayer cognitive error and the
charitable contribution deduction.
Part V considers hypersalience from market and political salience perspectives.
On market salience, it offers a counter-narrative to Faulhaber’s assertion that
Congress should intervene to address the effects of hypersalience. With respect to
political salience, Part V explores Schenk’s arguments for the exploitation of
salience in tax design to measure whether these points apply with equal weight to
hypersalient tax provisions. To conclude, this Article offers the following policy
recommendation: Congress should not affirmatively correct the charitable
contribution deduction’s hypersalience because exploitation of its effect on taxpayer
behavior is justifiable.
II. SALIENCE AND TAXES
A. Salience Defined and Applied
On first impression, the notion of exploitation as a tax policy device appears
nearly invalid on its face. When the exploited object is the American taxpayer’s
cognitive biases with respect to decision-making, the prospect seems even less
appealing. In at least one context, however—the cognitive bias of salience—this
predictable aversion is not so easily justified.

37

Id. at 310.
See generally Jacob Goldin & Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Salience, 16 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 144 (2013) (finding nearly half of all eligible taxpayers are unaware of the
charitable contribution deduction and those who are aware underestimate the size of the
available tax deduction).
38
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Salience describes heuristics—cognitive shortcuts or “rules of thumb” that
simplify decisions39—associated with visibility, prominence, or vividness.40
Salience and awareness are corollaries. If information is highly or fully salient, it
approaches common knowledge. If individuals are generally unaware of
information, that information has low salience.
Normative disagreement exists among tax scholars with respect to low-salience
taxes.41 Some tax scholars, who often describe low-salience taxes as “hidden taxes,”
argue that increased salience is a desirable outcome, and the government’s
intentional use of low-salience taxes upends general concepts of representative
government and accountability and undermines economic efficiency.42 On the other
hand, Deborah Schenk counters that there are times when low-salience taxes are, in
fact, desirable and can be used as fiscal tools to exploit cognitive bias.43 Her position
is carefully crafted and depends upon a clear distinction between salience as a
measure of either economic (market) or political awareness of tax provisions.44
Schenk argues that a democracy-enhancing case can be made based on diminished
political salience, increasing political acceptance of low-salience taxes.45 David
Gamage and Darien Shanske continue this line in the literature and go on to conclude
that, at least in the context of market or economic salience, it is generally desirable
to lessen salience to any extent possible.46
This debate occurred in the context of the income tax and its “revenue-raising
tax provisions,” until Lilian Faulhaber recast the conversation to consider the
salience of provisions that decrease taxpayer burdens—deductions, exclusions, and
credits.47 She coined these “revenue-reducing tax provisions” and argued that the
salience discussion was incomplete without considering these provisions.48 For
Faulhaber, this was a critical omission in the literature, given the many ways in
39

Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings
Behavior, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 81, 82 (2007) (describing heuristics as a substitution process);
see Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1469 (2002) (“[P]eople sometimes answer a difficult question by
answering an easier one instead.”).
40
Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1886
(1994).
41
Salience literature has grown as the concept has been the vehicle to analyze, among
other topics, behavior in response to state taxation. See generally, e.g., Hayes R. Holderness,
The Unexpected Role of Tax Salience in State Competition for Businesses, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
1091, 1120 (2017).
42
See generally Brian Galle, Carrots, Sticks, and Salience, 67 TAX L. REV. 53, 69
(2013); Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 64–65 (2009) [hereinafter
Galle, Hidden Taxes].
43
Schenk, supra note 10, at 253.
44
Id. at 308.
45
Id. at 255.
46
Gamage & Shanske, supra note 10, at 99.
47
Faulhaber, supra note 21, at 1309.
48
Id.
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which misapprehension of deductions, exclusions, and credits mirrors the lowsalience revenue-raising tax provisions’ effect on taxpayer behavior. Low-salience
revenue-raising tax provisions, for example, tend to cause taxpayers to
underestimate their tax burden.49 In reverse course, low-salience revenue-reducing
tax provisions cause taxpayers to over-estimate reductions to their tax burden.50 In
either case, and generally detrimentally, taxpayers underappreciate their ultimate tax
exposure. Thus, for Faulhaber, hidden taxes and hypersalient tax provisions are
economic equivalents.51
As a model for analysis, Faulhaber narrows on the salience of the charitable
contribution deduction. What she observes, however, does not neatly fit within the
scale of high or low-salience. On the one hand, Faulhaber finds that the charitable
contribution deduction as a revenue-reducing provision is fully—or almost fully—
salient.52 Because many petitions for charitable giving include some suggestion or
implication of tax benefit, most taxpayers are aware of and make decisions operating
under the impression that charitable giving affects their tax circumstance
favorably.53 On the other hand, relatively few people perceive or appreciate the
limitations associated with the charitable contribution deduction—most
significantly, the standard deduction’s blanket preclusion to any direct tax benefit
for charitable giving.54 On this account, limitations restricting the application of the
charitable contribution deduction are low-salience provisions.55
To describe a high-salience tax provision with low-salience limitations or
restrictions, Faulhaber introduces the concept of hypersalience to the legal tax
literature. This term, as Faulhaber uses it, seems to capture elements of multiple
cognitive biases.56 For example, the cognitive bias of overconfidence seems present
as taxpayers operate under the delusion that they understand the tax benefit
associated with charitable giving, and therefore have no desire to search for more
information that could reveal limitations or restrictions.57 Blocking—the notion that
something once learned impairs the ability to learn new things—another element of
cognition may also describe at least part of hypersalience. The high-salient nature of
the charitable contribution deduction may impair, or block, the taxpayer’s ability to
learn about its limitations or restrictions.58

49

Id.
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1309–10; see I.R.C. §§ 63(b), (c) (Supp. 2017).
55
Faulhaber, supra note 21, at 1309–10.
56
McCaffery notes that cognitive tendencies tend to converge or overlap. McCaffery,
supra note 40, at 1905.
57
Id. at 1911–12.
58
Id.
50
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After measuring both, Faulhaber ultimately concludes that the costs of
hypersalience outweigh any benefits through the lens of market salience.59 In turn,
she offers three alternatives for curing or at least mitigating, hypersalience, including
a policy recommendation that governments should limit statements made by private
third-party beneficiaries about tax-deductibility.60 Given that the government
already limits charities’ activities, she suggests that this could simply be another
element of regulation.61
Faulhaber’s recommendations echo scholarly discourse averse to “hidden
taxes” or low-salience revenue-raising taxes.62 Schenk, however, counters this line
of reasoning by arguing that low-salience taxes may have intrinsic value and a
normative argument exists for government exploitation of the cognitive bias of
political salience.63 Schenk’s analysis, however, is limited to revenue-raising tax
provisions. With Faulhaber’s introduction of hypersalience to the literature, and
given her suggestion that low-salience taxes and hypersalience taxes are economic
equivalents, a gap in the literature exists with respect to whether Schenk’s arguments
in favor of exploitation of political salience apply to hypersalience.
B. Salience as a Tool to Analyze Tax
Edward McCaffery brokered the merger of cognitive theory and tax on the
overall thesis that analyzing tax through the lens of behavioral decision theory could
help “explain major structural features of our existing tax system.”64 He cast his
rationale as both historical and prospective, arguing that cognitive tendencies could
explain how our tax system came to be and should be taken into account in the
development of any general normative theory of tax.65
To illustrate, McCaffery posited that cognitive biases affect the promulgation
and survival of tax laws in two ways. The first is active and conscious: that
lawmakers are influenced by cognition and may exploit cognitive biases to
maximize revenue collections and minimize opposition.66 The second is passive and
evolutionary: the idea that cognitively-favored tax laws are more likely to survive

59
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and become fixtures in the tax system than cognitively-disfavored tax laws.67 This
is not to suggest that cognitively-favored tax laws are normatively valid or even
correctly perceived. In fact, taxpayers may harbor cognitive biases in favor of certain
tax provisions based on incorrect perceptions of the tax law.68 Thus, in several
instances, our tax system is the product of evolution in the face of cognitive error.
McCaffery discusses several examples of cognitive biases at work in the tax
laws. At the forefront, he identifies hidden taxes,69 the functional counterpoint to
Faulhaber’s hypersalient tax reductions. Hidden taxes represent the byproduct of one
of the critical lessons in psychology literature on cognitive theory: that people are
especially averse to losses.70 Applied in a legislative tax setting, loss aversion
suggests that the tax-maximizing legislator ought to impose tax laws before the
money subject to the tax ever reaches the taxpayer’s hands.71 This strategy is not to
be construed as political gamesmanship that economically harms the taxpayer. This
theory plays off Kahneman and Tversky’s “prospect theory” and their general
finding that losses hurt more than gains feel good.72 In promulgation of the tax law,
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Id.
See, e.g., id. at 1930–31.
69
Id. at 1874. McCaffery identifies several examples of hidden taxes while separating
them into one of two categories: partially hidden or fully hidden taxes. Id. at 1875. He defines
a partially hidden tax as one that “simply involves taking money from taxpayers’ pockets
without necessarily telling them that they are paying a tax.” Id. Incidence of partially hidden
tax include the sales tax (where the tax is not included in the listed price of the good) and
perhaps the even more inconspicuous (but still not completely hidden) excise taxes on certain
commodities such as fuel, alcohol, and tobacco products. Id. The upshot is that, “taxpayers
somehow do not notice or object to” these types of taxes. Id. McCaffery defines a fully
hidden tax as one that “involves appropriating the money before it ever reaches the hands of
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corporate income tax to exhibit a fully “hidden pattern.” Id. at 1875–76. Both taxes are levied
and syphoned off to the government before ever reaching the potential recipients hands. Id.
McCaffery distinguishes the partially hidden tax from the fully hidden tax as follows: the
partially hidden tax involves an “initial giving followed by a surreptitious taking away,”
while the fully hidden tax involves “no giving in the first place; deceit precedes receipt, so
to speak.” Id. at 1876.
70
See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect of
Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 289, 290 (2006) (noting
how hidden taxes are promulgated due to taxpayers’ strong aversion to losses). McCaffery
and Baron’s experiments suggest that taxpayers “preferred ‘hidden’ taxes to transparent
ones.” Id. at 289. They further suggest that uncertainty about the incidence of a tax “may be
perceived as a good thing” and “may lead to a relative muting of a fairly general tax
aversion.” Id. at 291.
71
McCaffery, supra note 40, at 1890.
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See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (discussing “expected utility theory as
a descriptive model of decision making under risk,” and developing an alternative theory,
prospect theory, which found that losses hurt more than gains feel good).
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loss aversion stands for the idea that a hidden tax spares taxpayers the cognitive
strain that comes with receiving money and then having to give some of it back.
Most relevant to this discussion, McCaffery highlights the influence cognitive
biases can have on tax deductions—the context in which Faulhaber frames the
hypersalience phenomenon. McCaffery predicts that, just as individuals will
overvalue nontaxable benefits (e.g., fringe benefits), they will overestimate the taxdeductible component of tax deductions like charitable gifts.73 In other words, it
seems that for McCaffery, the cognitive tendency Faulhaber describes as
hypersalience would develop of its own accord, based on heuristics.
McCaffery’s prediction is based on the framing heuristic—the phenomenon
under which “individuals react to the purely formal way in which a question is
presented or ‘framed.’”74 Framing and hypersalience explain similar cognitive errors
from different perspectives. While acknowledging that “a good many charitable
contributions come from non-itemizers,”75 McCaffery focuses on the itemizer’s
cognitive error. The itemizer tends to massively over-value the deduction for
charitable giving such that she gives more than what the tax rate change and
economic rationality might suggest is appropriate.76 To explain this overreaction, he
theorizes that the prominence heuristic (salience) of the tax rates, combined with the
framing effect of being able to make a “‘fully tax deductible’ gift” combine to
mislead taxpayers.77
Faulhaber’s notion of hypersalience considers the charitable contribution
deduction from the perspective of the non-itemizer.78 Her normative response to the
phenomenon of hypersalience is that the onus falls on the government to correct
cognitive error through additional regulation in an already heavily regulated area of
tax.79 As a general matter, McCaffery stops short of recommending additional
regulation in the face of cognitive error. He recommends a more nuanced approach
that gauges costs and benefits associated with a more overtly paternalistic reaction
to heuristics.80
His temperate approach is motivated by the following axiomatic statement: “[i]t
is always a bit dangerous to conclude too quickly that the people are ignorant.”81
Preference utilitarianism, or methodological individualism, is an economic theory
that suggests any recommendations related to any normative social theory should be
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cast in a light that respects and accepts individual preferences.82 McCaffery applies
this theory to cognitive biases and heuristics related to tax and suggests that a nonpaternalistic response requires consideration of the idea that “‘as a matter of
psychology’ . . . people [may be] happier . . . living under hidden taxes.”83
It might be fair to say that McCaffery’s general aversion towards creating
awareness of hidden taxes—at least not without carefully considering the
psychological cost—is the springboard for Deborah Schenk’s theory that cognitive
errors, in particular the salience bias, should be exploited in tax design. That is to
say, Schenk’s view is that hidden taxes should not only stay hidden but should also
be used as a tool to effect fiscal policy, as the next Part discusses.
III. EXPLOITING THE SALIENCE BIAS IN DESIGNING TAXES
Schenk’s proposal begins with the acknowledgement of her contrarian position:
scholarly dialogue approaches a consensus “that increased salience is preferred and
that the intentional use of low-salience taxes by the government is undesirable.”84
The second stanza of this premise is where Schenk’s work reverberates.
McCaffery’s position on the introduction of cognitive theory to legal tax research85
left room for debate on the desirability of hidden taxes. McCaffery’s narrative,
however, was offered in the context of unintentional, but practically unavoidable,
cognitive errors that follow the public’s perception of the tax laws.86 McCaffery
wanted lawmakers to be aware of taxpayers’ lack of awareness.87 In contrast,
Schenk’s bold position is that lawmakers should not only be aware of taxpayers’
lack of awareness but should also exploit that lack of awareness.88 As such, her paper
offers the first “comprehensive case for the normative desirability of low-salience
taxes.”89
Schenk’s proposal is less a contradiction to the other literature and more a
contortion of it. In order to prevent misunderstanding and to reconcile her proposal
with other scholarly work, she clearly differentiates the two different types of
salience identified in the literature: economic (or market) salience and political
salience.90 Economic or market salience describes the cognitive perception that
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causes a change in individual decision-making relative to the market.91 That is, in
the context of taxes, economic or market salience considers the way in which
taxpayers’ economic responses vary with the salience of a tax or a tax provision.
Political salience, on the other hand, measures the political response to
government action.92 That is, political salience measures the “political reaction or
response from the electorate to the adoption of a tax or tax provision.”93 These
reactions come in the form of acceptance, rejection, or no response at all.94 Applied
to the American taxpayer, economic salience is distinguished from political salience
based on the direction of the response to a tax or tax provision. Economic salience
(or lack thereof) measures taxpayers’ reactions to the market. Political salience
measures taxpayers’ reactions to legislators, as expressed through the political
process.
Schenk offers two abstract examples to illustrate how political salience could
affect the legislative process as lawmakers respond to the electorate’s awareness of
the tax law. The first example frames the question from a revenue-maximizing
legislator’s perspective, whose political environment makes it a challenge to raise
taxes. That legislator could exploit the availability bias by consciously proposing
and voting for low-salience tax provisions.95 The counterpoint, and second example,
is the tax-averse legislator who could highlight or try to increase the salience of tax
increase proposals in a way that would gather opposition to them.96
Schenk follows the abstract with actual examples of low-salience tax provisions
where evidence suggests that Congress intentionally designed these taxes with
obfuscation in mind. Low-salience tax provisions are typically passed without much
fanfare, not highlighted by the administrative agency administering the provision,
and receive little media attention.97 The withholding of income taxes on wages is an
example of a low-salience collection system.98 Similarly, a tax increase was
achieved without raising rates with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
which reduced itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers.99 To this point,
phase-outs generally represent low-salience tax increases. Schenk notes that, up until
1981, Congress enjoyed the low-salience tax increases (“inflation creep”) that
followed inflation.100 Before then, the rates were not indexed for inflation, and yearly
tax increases went relatively undetected as buying power diminished, but rates
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remained static. Rampant inflation increased political salience enough relative to
this yearly automatic tax increase to compel legislators to action.101
To explain the use of salience as a fiscal policy tool, Schenk crafts her argument
from the perspective of political-economy: that there are some circumstances in
which it is appropriate for legislators to take advantage of cognitive biases in
designing taxes.102 She builds her argument on the basis of two fundamental
constructs: (1) the state has the power to levy taxes; and (2) the state has an
appropriate need for revenue. If these statements are true, then it is proper, according
to Schenk’s argument, for the state to choose a form of taxation that is the most
palatable, though not necessarily the most salient, to its citizens.103
This position is premised on what Schenk considers contradictory and perhaps
mutually exclusive ideals: the citizenry wants public goods (including redistribution
of wealth) but abhors taxation.104 That is, the citizenry looks to the government to
provide certain goods and services for its general welfare. Yet, even so, the citizenry
disdains the means by which those goods and services are funded. For Schenk, these
competing positions justify the government’s use of fiscal tools that can “accomplish
the revenue goal with the least pain and most acceptance.”105
Schenk’s justification for exploiting hypersalience considers more than a
politician’s selfish interests. That is, it goes beyond the Leviathan-inspired106
justification that politicians are revenue-maximizing and interested solely in their
own reelections.107 Schenk acknowledges Finkelstein’s108 determination that
politicians will be rewarded by adopting less salient taxes and punished for adopting
more salient taxes.109 Yet, Schenk’s argument is more layered and bends towards the
notion of “political acceptance of taxes by the populace.”110 To paraphrase Schenk,
101
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it would be foolhardy to suggest that lawmakers should unabashedly favor lowsalience taxes because of their political expediency.111 Yet it would be just as shortsighted, taking into account the citizenry’s generally strong aversion to taxes, to
suggest that lawmakers should not take salience into account as a fiscal policy tool
to spare taxpayers the “psychic pain of paying taxes.”112
To illustrate, Schenk conjures a general political setting in which exploiting
salience might be preferable: one where Congress’s political climate makes it
“impossible for Congress to raise tax rates directly,” even where additional revenues
are warranted. 113 In this type of setting, low-salience taxes have the potential to
overcome a political-economy of tax legislation.114
In circumstances like these, Schenk offers a three-pronged argument to justify
Congress’s use of low-salience taxes: (1) general cognitive preferences to avoid
losses; (2) budget crises; and (3) political rhetoric that makes it difficult to raise taxes
directly. Schenk’s first justification for low-salience taxes examines the cognitive
bias of loss aversion as an analog to tax aversion.115 As noted above, loss aversion
follows from Kahneman and Tversky’s “prospect theory.”116 This theory is based on
a cognitive bias, which suggests that to the human mind, losses are more painful
than gains are pleasurable, so humans tend to prefer loss avoidance over equivalent
gains.117 Schenk cites the loss aversion literature associated with tax to suggest that
the “disutility from paying taxes is greater than that from other types of losses.”118
This illustrates the precariousness of Congress’s circumstance. Taxpayers operate
with a general aversion to any loss but assign particular disdain to losses generated
through taxes. This is true even while taxpayers expect Congress to fund government
programs that provide for their welfare.119 Thus, an initial justification for the use of
111
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politically low-salience taxes, given strong taxpayer aversion to increased taxes, is
that low-salience taxes may be politically unavoidable when considered in light of
the cognitive biases under which taxpayers operate.
As a second justification for exploiting low-salience taxes, Schenk considers
the budget crisis in which the United States was then operating.120 This reasoning
rings even truer with the promulgation of the TCJA, which—according to
Congressional Budget Office estimates—will increase the budget deficit by around
$12 trillion.121 This justification could be a subset to or consequence of the tax
aversion concept. Schenk affirms, based on government reports, that under thencurrent law (2009) the federal government would only collect enough revenue to
meet two-thirds of expected expenditures by 2080.122 The TCJA will most likely
exacerbate this disparity.
Simply stated, yet rife with political peril, Schenk considers two possible
solutions to dramatic budget imbalances: (1) cut spending, and/or (2) raise revenue.
Schenk points out that neither Congress nor the public has shown much of an
appetite for spending cuts.123 Elements of the Leviathan hypothesis lurk beneath this
barrier to fiscal solvency, this time related to the cognitive bias of loss aversion.124
Once a government program is in place, it is hard to take away. The second solution
Schenk considers for addressing budget imbalances—raising revenue—generally
faces bleak prospects in light of the citizenry’s general and strong aversion to tax
increases.125 Schenk elaborates on this conundrum and goes so far as to suggest that
the current political climate makes it impossible to increase rates or expand the base
in a direct and salient way.126
Schenk’s third prong suggests that low salience taxes may be the only option
left for raising taxes, given a Congress rife with political rhetoric and an electorate
utterly averse to new taxes.127 Her rationale is explained through Mancur Olson’s
public choice theory, an economic model used to explain interest group politics.128

120

Schenk, supra note 10, at 299.
CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018 TO 2028, at 4
(2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-04/53651-outlook-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TRC7-RA7N]. Summary Table 2 notes that over the period 2019–2028, projected revenues
will be $44.2 trillion relative to $56.6 trillion of outlays. Id.
122
Schenk, supra note 10, at 299 (citing FIN. MGMT. SERV., U.S. TREASURY DEP’T,
FINANCIAL REPORTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: 2009 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT - MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 23 chart J (Feb. 26,
2010), http://www.gao.gov/financial/fy2009/09mda.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQP7-WKSC].
123
Id.
124
See McCaffery, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
125
Schenk, supra note 10, at 299.
126
Id. at 300.
127
Id.
128
Id. (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)).
121

436

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

Under Olson’s model, the government is an actor in a market transaction,
“providing goods and services (via legislation) to interest groups.”129 In turn, these
interest groups, while seeking to maximize their members’ incomes, “bid for
legislation and pay for it” with campaign contributions and votes.130 Schenk points
to two scholarly works that have attempted to explain tax legislation through public
choice theory.131 As Schenk highlights, Doernberg and McChesney make a rentseeking argument: that unstable federal tax legislation can be explained “by
Congress’s responding to well-organized groups who paid for tax benefits that
maximized their wealth.”132 Likewise, McCaffery and Cohen suggest that tax
legislation may be better explained, but not completely explained, by rent extraction:
politicians have a tendency to focus on tax provisions that apply “to very few people
who face high stakes” and then threaten to eliminate the rent by imposing higher
taxes elsewhere or eliminating a tax incentive.133 Schenk leans towards this model
as a better predictive tool to forecast political behavior. The rent extraction model
predicts that Congress will avoid ballot box issues (e.g., setting tax rates) during
elections and that “payments” to politicians (e.g., donations and votes) may occur to
simply maintain the status quo.134 It also suggests that interest groups and legislators
are equally interested in recurring opportunities to bargain and extract rents,
respectively.135 This means that interest groups lobbying for benefits will be
disinterested in tax rate changes, as such rate changes could potentially block future
opportunities for bargaining.136 In this light, public choice theory supports the view
that raising taxes—a ballot box issue—will be of equally little interest to interest
groups and legislators alike.
Schenk cites several other impediments that compound barriers to direct tax
reform. One such compounding barrier is the permanent campaign station in which
members of Congress find themselves—dedicating efforts to raising money rather
129
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than engaging in thoughtful dialogue with an eye towards collaboration for the
public good.137 The “poisonous atmosphere with respect to taxes” similarly makes
direct tax increases unlikely.138 This atmosphere becomes more toxic as the public
consumes media sound bites and political takes to formulate an opinion on tax
policy, with particular angst for anything that may be contrived as a tax increase.
This all culminates with irreconcilable taxpayer perspective: to pay as little tax as
possible but to receive as large public benefits as possible.
For Schenk then, because politics dictates tax policy in the real world, a
normative argument exists for the government to take advantage of cognitive error,
rather than attempt to correct it.139 On this groundwork, Schenk builds her argument
subject to two conditions. First, the process by which low-salience taxes are
promulgated must be reasonably transparent.140 Second, the information with respect
to the low-salience provisions must be readily available.141 If these conditions are
satisfied, Schenk asserts, “there is no convincing argument that it would be wrong
for the government to take error into account by effectively using politically pleasing
taxes or provisions.”142
These conditions, to some degree, clarify and validate Schenk’s position.
Exploitation of the taxpayer’s cognitive bias is distinguishable from exploitation of
the taxpayer. Schenk is not arguing for the promulgation of tax laws that are
unknowable or undiscoverable to the taxpayer. With all candor, she argues that
information regarding low-salience taxes should be within the reach of any taxpayer
who chooses to make an effort to find it.143 Similarly, the process through which
those laws come to light should be discoverable if the taxpayer feels so compelled.144
The cognitive bias of salience exists because most taxpayers will not make that
effort.
Kahneman illustrates the process through which the human mind perceives
information with two distinct systems: System 1 and System 2.145 The human mind
relies on System 1 to react, interpret, and otherwise manage daily existence.146 Only
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when compelled by a difficult task will the human mind engage System 2, and
concert effort towards that task.147 Schenk’s framework relies on the laziness of the
human mind and its ongoing tendency to System 1. Low-salience taxes only remain
so because taxpayers will generally be unwilling to engage System 2 to make the tax
provisions more salient. Schenk’s conditions ensure that means of enactment and
information with respect to the tax provisions are observable and available to the
taxpayer.
Put another way, Schenk describes salience as exogenous148 (i.e., salience is
caused by external forces or factors outside the tax provision). This idea, mingled
with Kahneman’s framework, seems to suggest that salience exists in circumstances
where: (1) the tax law is not simple enough to understand with System 1; (2) the
media or other external parties distill the tax law to something that can be understood
with System 1 in the form of a newspaper article (or increasingly more common, a
tweet); or (3) taxpayers engage System 2 to fully understand or react to certain tax
provisions. Circumstance 1 is as likely as circumstance 3 is unlikely. Circumstance
2 usually occurs in the context of rates and a superficial understanding of deductions
and exemptions. Most taxpayers will rely on System 1 to perceive the tax law.149
They will understand it to the extent it enables them to formulate a System 1-inspired
map of their tax exposure.150 The key element here is that they are cognitively
satisfied with this understanding because to understand any further would compel
System 2 engagement.
In all this, for Schenk, “an attempt to minimize the perceived burden of a tax is
not wrong per se.”151 Congress needs revenues, but raising taxes is politically
difficult. The use of low-salience taxes, subject to Schenk’s conditions, represents a
viable alternative to continued deficit spending.
IV. FAULHABER’S HYPERSALIENCE
Faulhaber’s contribution to the literature represents the first analysis of
“revenue-reducing tax provisions” through the lens of salience. As explored above,
for Faulhaber, this was an omission in the literature related to a significant aspect of
salience. In the case of revenue-raising provisions, taxpayers tend to underestimate
their tax liability as a tax becomes less salient.152 By contrast, in the case of revenuereducing tax provisions, taxpayers underestimate their tax liability (as they
overestimate the reduction to their tax burden) as tax-reducing provisions become
more salient.153 In either case, misapprehension of tax exposure occurs.
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In her salience analysis of revenue-reducing provisions, Faulhaber identified
the charitable contribution deduction as the quintessential example of
hypersalience.154 Though the charitable deduction is not the only tax-reducing
provision that bears hypersalient qualities, Faulhaber considers it the best vehicle for
exploring hypersalience’s implications. After all, she notes, it is perhaps the most
well-known deduction as charities commonly alert potential donors that their
donations are tax-deductible.155 At the same time, relatively few people are aware of
the limitations associated with the charitable deduction.156
A. The Effects of Hypersalience
To explain why hypersalience deserves policymakers’ attention, Faulhaber
makes three distinct points: (1) through promises of tax benefit for donations, thirdparty charities create general awareness of the charitable contribution deduction,
without fully announcing associated limitations; (2) the notion of hypersalience calls
into question the effectiveness of economic models for validating tax policy; and (3)
hypersalience “may lead to an economically inefficient level of consumption.”157
First, hypersalience explains a likely unintended consequence of governmentsubsidized charitable giving: that third-parties can play a significant role in
increasing taxpayer-awareness of the charitable contribution deduction, even if only
on the most superficial level.158 Charitable appeals are often followed by or offered
in connection with a promise of tax benefit.159 The promise of tax deductibility is
not a trivial matter for charities. They navigated the process of obtaining tax-exempt
status and have acquiesced to certain rules pertaining to that exemption. For
example, they sacrifice their ability to intervene (positively or negatively) in the
political campaign process.160 They pledge to engage in lobbying only as an ancillary
154
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activity to their primary charitable purpose.161 All this then, from the charities’
perspectives, entitles them to flout their status as a charity capable of receiving taxdeductible donations.
By the same token, charities have no interest in educating the population of
potential donors regarding the limitations associated with charitable giving—in
particular, the mutual exclusivity associated with itemizing (receiving a benefit for
charitable giving) or taking the standard deduction (receiving no benefit for
charitable giving). Thus, third-party, non-governmental actors propagate
hypersalience, according to Faulhaber, as charities market the charitable
contribution deduction (increasing its general salience) while limitations remain
hidden from general public awareness.162
The second reason Faulhaber cites for why hypersalience deserves
policymakers’ attention is that hypersalience suggests economic models for
validating tax policy may not accurately capture taxpayer behavior.163 This point
underlies the dissonance between economics and psychology.164 In the context of
the charitable contribution deduction, Faulhaber highlights economic models of
price elasticity as an example.165 These models measure the incentivizing effect of
the charitable contribution deduction given that the tax benefits associated with
charitable giving decrease the marginal price of giving.166 Specifically, they inquire:
“what percentage change in giving is engendered by a one percent decrease in the
price of giving?”167 Economists consider this measure “the ‘treasury efficiency’ of
the tax incentive.”168 Ignoring the existence of hypersalience, Faulhaber suggests
161
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that economic models of price elasticity may “underestimate taxpayer response to
changes in tax rates and the charitable contribution deduction may, in fact, be more
treasury efficient than previously thought.”169
Faulhaber points to overconsumption as a third and final reason for which
policymakers should understand the effects of hypersalience on decision-making.170
Ostensibly, hypersalience invites taxpayers to consume more of certain goods (in
this case, to make more charitable contributions) than they would if the deduction
were fully salient. Though Faulhaber acknowledges that this, in the context of
charitable giving, may be fine, it could raise concerns with respect to other
deductions like the home mortgage interest deduction.171
B. Hypersalience and the Charitable Contribution Deduction
At the outset, Faulhaber concedes that she can point to no empirical proof to
confirm the existence of hypersalience.172 Studies have confirmed that taxpayer
motivation for giving may be based on pure altruism or a combination of altruism
and tax benefit.173 Otherwise, Faulhaber depends on anecdotal support for the
general notion that the charitable contribution deduction is salient. She points to “all
types of media”—with particular emphasis on media disseminated for the purpose
of drumming up support for public charities—that help contribute to the public
awareness of tax benefit correlating with charitable giving.174
Though it is true that no empirical studies existed at the time to test the saliency
of the charitable contribution deduction, Jacob Goldin and Yair Listokin, a year after
Faulhaber’s article was published, investigated the salience of the charitable
contribution deduction and the home mortgage interest deduction.175 Their findings
generally contravene Faulhaber’s assertion that at least superficially, the charitable
contribution deduction approaches full saliency.176
Goldin and Listokin’s study concerns the perception of incentives: how do
taxpayers perceive the tax benefits associated with the charitable contribution
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deduction and the home mortgage interest deduction?177 On this point, they identify
three potential levels of perception. First, taxpayers may “correctly perceive the
incentives the expenditures generate”—a “fully salient” tax expenditure.178 Second,
taxpayers may “under-account for the true incentives the expenditures generate”—
a result which compels a “low-salience” classification in relation to the tax
expenditure.179 Finally, taxpayers may “overestimat[e] the associated tax benefits”
stemming from a tax expenditure.180 Goldin and Listokin classify this perception as
“hyper-salient.”181
These classifications are further distilled into economic explanations. Goldin
and Listokin first define terms: the “true [(also termed actual)] subsidy rate” is equal
to “the actual effect of a tax expenditure on the after-tax price of the targeted
behavior.”182 The “perceived subsidy rate” is equal to the “tax savings as understood
by taxpayers when making decisions.”183 Given these definitions, a tax expenditure
has “low salience” if “the perceived subsidy rate is below the actual [true] subsidy
rate.”184 A tax expenditure has “full salience” if the perceived subsidy rate and the
actual subsidy rate are about equal.185 “Hypersalience” defines a tax expenditure in
which the “perceived subsidy rate exceeds the actual subsidy rate.”186
Goldin and Listokin identify two distinct ways in which tax expenditures fall
short of or exceed full salience. In one, taxpayers make “eligibility mistakes” (i.e.,
“errors as to whether they qualify for a particular tax subsidy”).187 In the other,
taxpayers make “magnitude errors” (i.e., they make “mistakes about the amount of
savings associated with a particular subsidy for which they qualify”).188
Eligibility mistakes can occur positively or negatively. Goldin and Listokin
describe an eligibility mistake that occurs when “a taxpayer who is eligible for the
[charitable contribution deduction] . . . falsely believe[s] that he is not eligible” as a
“false-negative.”189 In the other direction, they describe a taxpayer who falsely
believes himself eligible for the charitable contribution deduction to make a “falsepositive mistake.”190 A false negative undermines the incentive as taxpayers
operating under this perception will be less inclined to give. A false positive will
compel taxpayers to give without any actual tax incentive to do so.
177
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“Magnitude errors” distort the amount of tax benefit available to a taxpayer.191
Goldin and Listokin illustrate with a single filing status, itemizing taxpayer whose
taxable income will be taxed at a marginal rate of 25%.192 The true subsidy rate for
every dollar donated to charity is 25 cents.193 If this taxpayer “under-estimates the
actual subsidy, . . . the perceived price of charitable giving will exceed 75 cents,”
which is a deterrent to giving.194 If the taxpayer overestimates the actual subsidy, the
perceived price of charitable giving will be less than 75 cents, thus enhancing the
perceived benefit of additional donations.195
With all this as groundwork, the study’s findings were counterintuitive as they
related to the charitable contribution deduction. Eligibility mistakes were estimated
based on the taxpayer’s response to question #13 of the survey: “When your[sic] file
your income taxes, do you usually itemize deductions or do you take the standard
deduction?”196 Potential responses to these questions were: “I usually itemize my
deductions; I usually take the standard deduction; and I don’t know.”197 Goldin and
Listokin then measured the frequency with which taxpayers correctly responded to
a separate question on whether charitable giving would affect the amount of taxes
owed to the government. Taking itemizers and non-itemizers as a whole, 72%
correctly perceived the effect that charitable giving would have on their overall tax
liability (decrease taxes for itemizers; no effect for non-itemizers).198 Forty-six
percent of itemizing respondents made false negative mistakes, reporting that
charitable giving would have no effect on their tax liability.199 Finally, and perhaps
most perilously for Faulhaber’s anecdotal assumptions, only 11% of non-itemizers
made “false-positive” mistakes; as ineligible taxpayers, they perceived that
charitable giving would reduce their tax liability.200
Though Goldin and Listokin had not yet published their paper, Faulhaber had
access to the unpublished manuscript and briefly responded to Goldin and Listokin’s
findings. She made two points. First, she noted that the study focused on taxpayers
“who are aware of their itemization status.”201 Respondents who answered that they
did not know their filing statuses were excluded from the analysis.202 This exclusion
allowed Goldin and Listokin to narrow on their research questions, but the effect of
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this exclusion for Faulhaber is that the question of hypersalience (as she defined it)
was not directly addressed in the study.203
That said, her second point notes Goldin and Listokin did detect that “a number
of taxpayers who do not itemize believe they get a benefit from revenue-reducing
tax provisions.”204 This was “itself evidence of hypersalience.”205 Faulhaber’s
reference here is to the 11% of nonitemizers who made false-positive mistakes—
they responded that charitable giving would help their tax circumstance.206 Though
accurate, this small minority of nonitemizer respondents must have been short of
what Faulhaber had expected based on anecdotal experience and conventional
wisdom.
Three additional observations are warranted in relation to the interplay between
Faulhaber’s study and Goldin and Listokin’s findings. First, Goldin and Listokin’s
definition of salience seems to differ from Faulhaber’s, which considers the
“prominence of an item: the more salient something is, the more aware individuals
are of its effects.”207 The focal point of Faulhaber’s definition is cognitive awareness
based on prominence or lack thereof. This suggests a System 1208 type of thinking
operation; a taxpayer relies on her innate ability to become aware of the charitable
contribution deduction without engaging System 2 to explore whether that
superficial level of understanding is correct. In contrast, Goldin and Listokin’s
definition of salience focuses on individual perception of the tax law.209 This is a
nuanced distinction. Awareness is a state of cognition. Perception requires more than
awareness; it requires learning. Awareness is a state of being. Perception connotes
active understanding. Perception springs from engaging System 2210 thinking
operation and allocating some level of mental effort to determine whether
understanding is accurate.
Consider that Goldin and Listokin investigate the way in which individuals
perceive the tax law related to the charitable contribution deduction and the home
mortgage interest deduction, specifically their perception of incentives.211 Correct
perception of incentives is the measure for full salience.212 An under-accounting
perception suggests low-salience and an over-accounting perception
hypersalience.213
Contrast Goldin and Listokin’s definitions with Faulhaber’s more expansive,
even if less precise, definition of salience. Her focus is the prominence (awareness)
203
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of tax provisions and the tax system as a whole in the minds of taxpayers,
irrespective of true understanding of the provisions’ implications.214 In other words,
by Faulhaber’s definition, a tax-reducing provision is fully salient when taxpayers
are generally aware of the provision—something approaching common knowledge.
A tax-reducing provision has low salience if taxpayers are unaware of or fail to
apprehend its incidence. These taxes are also described as hidden taxes.215 For
Faulhaber, a tax-reducing provision is hypersalient if taxpayers are fully aware of
the tax provision’s existence, but are unaware of or fail to appreciate associated
limitations or restrictions.216 For Goldin and Listokin, hypersalience is less a matter
of awareness and more a matter of misperception through overestimation.217 Their
definition of hypersalience assumes that the taxpayer is aware of the tax provision
and its associated limitations and benefits, but misperceives aspects of the provision
to his or her peril.218
In other words, if Goldin and Listokin had tested Faulhaber’s definition of
salience in their survey, it would have been a more broadly construed question. For
example, rather than asking, in question #3, “How does giving money to charity
affect your income taxes?,”219 the question would have been, “Does giving money
to charity affect your income taxes?” To test Faulhaber’s definition of hypersalience,
the question may have been posed to taxpayers who were aware that giving money
to charity affects their income taxes along these lines: “Does the law limit any
positive tax effect that giving to charity provides?” Thus, the inquiries would
measure the respondent’s general awareness that charitable giving plays a role in the
tax formula, subject to limitations, but without exploring further as to whether the
taxpayer understood the details of this role.
In sum, Goldin and Listokin, relative to Faulhaber, are considering separate
ideas. To be sure, the salience definitions are related; but they are distinct in
important ways that may help reconcile the two articles. With this reconciliation,
Faulhaber’s definition of hypersalience—the object of this paper—survives Goldin
and Listokin’s study and remains viable as a tool for analyzing tax policy.
As a second observation, Edward McCaffery suggests that the papers are
complementary.220 He notes that Faulhaber’s definition of hypersalience relates to
“a phenomenon common to marketers . . . —ignoring the fine print.”221 Taxpayers
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“focus on the salient benefit, to the exclusion of the less salient restrictions.”222 He
considers Faulhaber to have identified a “possibility,”223 akin to a person signing up
for a timeshare property without reading the fine print. The aspiring vacationer
focuses on the possibility of affordable vacation residences in a variety of exotic
places without taking into account undesirable timeframes of availability or
excessive cancellation fees. Faulhaber theorizes (and Goldin and Listokin do not
disprove) that some taxpayers focus only on the possibility of deduction without
exploring associated limitations.
For McCaffery, Faulhaber’s study may be best understood as a part of Goldin
and Listokin’s “empirical analysis of what taxpayers actually think.”224 To make this
point, he emphasizes that 11% of nonitemizers who incorrectly believed that tax
benefit flows from their charitable giving “is not an insignificant number (as 90% of
all taxpayers now don’t itemize, so that’s like 10% of the taxpaying public.)”225 In
all, Goldin and Listokin empirically discover that “lots of stuff” seem to be going on
with the charitable contribution deduction, and Faulhaber’s “effect may be a part of
that.”226
McCaffery’s main point of distinction is that Faulhaber’s hypersalience is
“theoretical, a possibility result,” while Goldin and Listokin’s study is empirical.227
The empirical approach confirms that “the real world is complex, because there are
often cross currents, and this may be especially true in tax (which is complex).”228
Faulhaber’s theory is not inconsistent with this overall finding.
A third and final, though much more brief observation is warranted: if we focus
on Goldin and Listokin’s findings, that “taxpayers appear to markedly underestimate
the tax savings associated with charitable donations,” it should sound an alarm for
charities.229 Goldin and Listokin note that this finding contravenes conventional
wisdom, but suggest that the charitable contribution deduction is an ineffective way
to promote charitable giving.230 By the same token, it may well imply that charities
are ineffectively promoting the tax benefits associated with giving.
For purposes of this discussion, this Article acknowledges that Goldin and
Listokin’s work related to tax expenditure salience is an important contribution to
the literature. Even so, this work did not disprove Faulhaber’s anecdotal assertions
related to salience as a construct of awareness, nor did it disprove her associated
analysis. As such, her analysis of hypersalience continues as the basis for this
Article.
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V. MARKET SALIENCE, POLITICAL SALIENCE, AND THE EXPLOITATION
OF HYPERSALIENCE
In the aftermath of the TCJA tax reform, the incentive of the charitable
contribution deduction was somewhat muted.231 Going forward, the increased
standard deduction will inevitably minimize the number of itemizing taxpayers.232
Even potentially more perilous for charities, at least anecdotally, taxpayers are (or
were on a broader proportional basis at the end of 2017) more aware of this effect in
the tax law. Yet this phenomenon is statutorily and politically temporary. By the
statute itself, the new standard deduction amounts will expire after December 31,
2025.233 Given the partisan terms on which Congress passed the TCJA into law,
there is a likelihood that a Democrat-controlled Congress will accelerate the
standard deduction’s return to pre-TCJA levels. 234
In either case, in time, if Faulhaber’s hypersalience has at all waned, it is likely
to reengage as a significant cognitive bias in the typical taxpayer’s awareness of the
charitable contribution deduction. With each day that passes, despite the standard
deduction’s moment in the limelight—November and December of 2017—it will
fade into obscurity. If and when the standard deduction returns to its pre-TCJA rates,
as noted above, it will likely garner general media attention. This attention has the
potential to enhance Faulhaber’s hypersalience to new levels on at least two fronts:
(1) via inadequate or inaccurate media portrayal; and (2) via promotions by charities.
First, the media’s broad-based coverage will likely not include a detailed
analysis of the mutually exclusive relationship between the standard deduction and
itemized deductions. The much more intriguing headline (one that will sell
newspapers or drive Internet traffic) will focus on the fact that more taxpayers will
now be able to deduct their charitable contribution deductions.
Many taxpayers who will consume this media coverage were not affected by
the TCJA and would not be affected by a reinstatement of pre-TCJA standard
deduction amounts.235 They are non-itemizers in either case: they take the standard
231
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deduction and receive no tax benefit for charitable giving. Nevertheless, their
perception may well have been affected. When reports in November and December
of 2017 announced that charities were in trouble because fewer taxpayers would be
eligible to deduct their charitable gifts (because they would opt to take the standard
deduction instead),236 a taxpayer’s reasonable conclusion may have been that tax
benefits no longer followed charitable giving. This was an inaccurate perception. In
the future, when media coverage reports that charities are either lauding Democrats
for reviving the charitable contribution deduction (through lowering the standard
deduction to pre-TCJA levels) or celebrating the expiration of the TCJA standard
deduction amounts at the end of 2025, taxpayer awareness will be affected in the
opposite direction. They could not be blamed for thinking their charitable giving is
deductible again, even if it never was in the first place.
In similar fashion, charity-sponsored marketing campaigns and promotional
events may place renewed emphasis on the expiration or revision of the TCJA
standard deduction amounts. Charities will have born as many as eight years with
the inflated standard deduction amounts. It will be their opportunity to make up for
lost time. It would be reasonable to assume that fundraising pitches and
advertisements could feature, perhaps more prominently than ever before, the
promise that donations are again tax-deductible.237 With all this then, what should
be done? Should hypersalience be squelched? Should Congress take affirmative
steps to unwind hypersalience before it returns to or surpasses pre-TCJA levels? Or
does an opportunity exist for the exploitation of hypersalience by simply leaving it
be? Answers to these questions will consider hypersalience through lenses of market
salience and political salience.
A. Market Salience
Schenk describes the notion of market salience238 as an economic response:
specifically an observation of how changes in individual decision making vary with
the salience of a tax or tax provision.239 For example, empirical studies have shown
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that a positive relationship exists between the degree of salience of sales and excise
taxes and the level of change in economic behavior.240
In their work on market and political salience, Gamage and Shanske describe
market salience as a study of “how tax presentation affects market decisions and
economic activity.”241 They normatively evaluate taxes in relation to market salience
and find (contrary to the predominant opinion in the literature) that policymakers
should work to reduce market salience.242 The benefits of reduced market salience
“may be overwhelmed by concerns related to: (1) distortionary income effects, (2)
externalities, and (3) distribution.”243
A significant element of their argument is explained through “substitution
effects,” meaning that shifts in taxpayer behavior occur when taxes alter the relative
price of goods and activities.244 In economic terms, the measure of the distortion is
commonly referred to as “deadweight loss.”245 To measure the deadweight loss
connected to relative market salience, Gamage and Shanske propose a two-step
analysis.
The first step is to imagine decisions taxpayers would have made in a
hypothetical pretax world.246 Step two is to calculate how taxpayers deviate from
this behavior as a result of taxation.247 To illustrate, Gamage and Shanske offer the
example of taxed hamburgers versus untaxed hot dogs. Assume, at step one, that a
taxpayer would prefer a hamburger in a pretax world.248 At step two, a tax is imposed
on that hamburger.249 In response to the tax, the taxpayer will either continue to eat
the hamburger, tax notwithstanding, or shift her consumption to something with less
or no tax (e.g., the untaxed hot dog).250 The latter reaction is an illustration of the
substitution effect. It shows how taxes cause market distortions or inefficiencies.
The deadweight loss is equal to the amount of the difference between the taxpayer’s
preference for a hamburger less the taxpayer’s amount of preference for a hot dog.251
In the event the tax is onerous enough to cause a change in consumption—
invoking the substitution effect—two undesirable outcomes follow: (1) the taxpayer
loses the enjoyment (utility) of eating a hamburger (creating deadweight loss); and
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(2) the government collects no additional revenues.252 These are undesirable results
on all fronts.
Gamage and Shanske go on to suggest that the substitution effect can be quelled
by reducing the market salience of a tax instrument.253 A lower market salience tax
instrument relative to a higher market salience equivalent instrument alleviates
deadweight loss caused by substitution effects.254 Taxpayers continue to eat
hamburgers, tax notwithstanding. The tax transfers resources to the government,
which are then transferred back to the taxpayer and others in the form of government
spending.255
A modified version of this model provides one aspect of the argument for
exploiting hypersalience, in the context of the charitable contribution deduction
from a market salience perspective.256 It begins with a change in assumption and
perspective: from the government’s standpoint, the substitution effect is desirable
(even if not in terms of economic efficiencies) and should be encouraged as the
taxpayer modifies behavior in response to the tax incentive—here, the salient portion
of the charitable contribution deduction. It also depends on the generally accepted
notion that charities fulfill a unique role in society. As they fulfill their charitable
purposes, they satisfy a societal need that markets cannot address, and governments
with limited resources do not have the wherewithal to satisfy. If charities are
underfunded and are thereby less able or unable to fulfill their charitable purposes,
the government (though likely with less precision and effectiveness) will have to
make up the difference.
Admittedly, this rationale applies in proportion to the societal benefit that a
charity provides. That benefit is largely dependent upon the charity’s role as a proxy
for the government. For example, if one of the government’s roles in society is to
address and mitigate poverty, the government has a strong incentive to subsidize
charities that also serve that purpose (likely with more precision and more
252
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efficiently). There is no role here for markets to play, and the government is unable
to offer a complete response to the poverty question in its own right. Charities close
the gap.
In contrast, the societal benefit that other types of charities offer is less acute
the more charities are removed from the government’s perceived societal role and
the more a ready market already exists for the charity’s services. The University of
Alabama football team, for example, enjoys tax-exempt status under the University
of Alabama’s umbrella.257 There is no expectation that the government provide this
type of service for the benefit of society. Moreover, the market already provides this
service in the form of the National Football League. Thus, the following analysis is
strongest if the charity fulfills a quasi-governmental role that markets have no
interest to satisfy. The argument wanes as the charity’s purpose moves outside the
scope of what society expects the government to provide, and markets offer a
substantially similar alternative.
With all this, consider a modified two-step analysis. Step one is to imagine
decisions the taxpayer would make in a hypothetical pretax world. In doing so, at
least initially, assume that a taxpayer has earmarked a certain amount of disposable
income—say $1,000—for giving to charitable, political, or other causes. Further,
assume that this money is dedicated to a “greater cause” and any apportionment
among charitable, political, and other causes would yield equal individual utility.
That is to say, market forces do not compel decisions as much as personal preference
for one charity over another, or political alignment with one candidate or cause
rather than another.
In this example, some, but likely not all of the earmarked funds would be
donated to charitable causes. All donations made to political or other causes not
connected with charities represent resources that could have been, but were not, used
to help charities fulfill their charitable purposes. This leaves charities short-handed
and more prone to demise. This also requires the government to spread its limited
resources even more thinly as it compensates for charities’ diminished ability to
fulfill their charitable purposes.
Under step two, calculate how the taxpayer deviates from this behavior in
response to the perceived tax incentive. The taxpayer’s behavioral response to the
general awareness (correct or not) that tax benefit follows charitable giving will
likely include a reapportionment of resources to those that yield the perceived tax
benefit (even if not actually on account of hypersalience). It is noteworthy that this
reapportionment causes no individual utility loss or deadweight loss. The taxpayer
has simply shifted his or her giving from a myriad of options that provided equal
individual utility to one option that provides more benefit to charities. Whether the
taxpayer’s understanding of the tax incentives was accurate is of no consequence
257
Richard Schmalbeck & Lawrence Zelenak, The NCAA and the IRS: Life at the
Intersection of College Sports and the Federal Income Tax, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1097–
98 (2019) (“Congress, the IRS, and the courts--have universally declared big-time sports to
be sufficiently related to the educational enterprise to avoid the status of unrelated business
activity.”).
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here. There is no utility loss, and the government benefits from the substitution
effect, as charities are better funded and equipped to fulfill their charitable purposes.
Now consider the effect of any efforts to quell hypersalience in this example.
If a taxpayer’s perception of the charitable contribution deduction were fully
corrected (i.e., the charitable contribution deduction became fully salient, not
hypersalient) such that taxpayers fully understood the relationship between
charitable giving, itemized deductions, and the standard deduction, the incentive
effects would be undermined and cause a reversion to step one. At step one, the
taxpayer, with no perceived tax incentive, would simply apportion funds according
to personal preference, perhaps with an inclination towards an even distribution.
Perhaps even worse, with full cognition that no tax benefit follows her charitable
giving, the taxpayer may reapportion funds away from charitable giving. In either
case, the charitable sector’s viability is undermined, while no positive change in
individual utility is achieved. Under each of these scenarios, individual utility
remains constant. Yet, charities, and in turn, the government that relies on charities
to provide critical services in its stead, are worse off.
Critics of this analysis may inquire: what if the taxpayer sets aside $1,000 to
spend, but does not necessarily earmark it for giving (to charity or otherwise)?
Rather, she has resolved that she will either donate the funds to charity or spend the
amount on goods or services. With hypersalience in full effect and the perception of
tax benefit in play, the taxpayer may well elect to donate funds that she would have
otherwise spent—a clear distortionary effect. With hypersalience corrected and the
taxpayer with full understanding of the charitable contribution deduction and its
associated limitations, the taxpayer may choose to spend in lieu of giving because
the taxpayer understands there is no benefit. In either case, the taxpayer parts with
$1,000.
Any deadweight loss here may well be justifiable if considered in light of the
fact that the taxpayer is choosing between two desirable outcomes (if not from a
purely economic perspective, then from a cognitive perspective). Hypersalience
coaxed the taxpayer down a path that reduced her individual utility through the
substitution effect, but not in the same way and so dramatically as eating an untaxed
hot dog rather than a taxed hamburger. Rather, the taxpayer chooses between two
equally acceptable alternatives, with hypersalience providing a nudge towards
charitable giving. Any deadweight loss might be rationalized as the taxpayer elects
to make a charitable donation, and the government indirectly benefits as charities
are more ably financed to fulfill their charitable purposes—all without providing an
actual subsidy (thanks to low salience limitations). If the taxpayer elects to spend,
the government will indirectly suffer as the charity is less able to fulfill its charitable
purpose.
A variation on this criticism exists with a different starting point: what of the
circumstance where hypersalience incentivizes a person to give who would not have
given at all with a correct understanding of the tax law—an outright distortion? This
inefficient outcome is Faulhaber’s primary concern in her call for curtailment of
hypersalience.
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She acknowledges hypersalience’s benefits in the form of increased charitable
giving258 and increased treasury efficiency.259 Hypersalience induces more
charitable giving without actual government subsidy. The charitable contribution
deduction, on its face, is economically inefficient, as it induces individuals to distort
their behavior from what they would do in absence of the tax incentive. Yet, to some
degree, this distortion was Congress’s purpose in the promulgation of the charitable
contribution deduction.260
For Faulhaber though, increased treasury efficiency does not offset
hypersalience’s costs. For example, she sees no way in which increased treasury
efficiency can justify the misinformation, cognitive misperception, and enhanced tax
illiteracy that follow hypersalience.261 Compounding these effects are third-party
marketers who amplify hypersalience as they act in their own self-interest (or at least
the interests of the charity).262 They tout their status as tax-exempt organizations and
provide confirmation that taxpayer donations are deductible. These claims increase
the salience of the deduction itself while limitations remain hidden in the
background. Faulhaber inquires: in a climate of tax illiteracy, “does it make sense
for third parties to spread information about deductions and the tax system as a
whole?”263
Faulhaber responds in the negative with three alternatives to curtail
hypersalience. The first two, she ultimately dismisses and really only entertains as
academic questions. The third, however, she endorses and offers as the culminating
policy recommendation of her article.
Faulhaber’s first proposal to curtail hypersalience is to change the tax system
so that hypersalience is impossible.264 That is, remove low-salience limitations
connected to the charitable contribution deduction such that only the salient general
awareness that tax benefit flows from charitable giving is accurate. The most severe
limitation related to the charitable contribution deduction is the standard deduction.
A nonitemizer charitable contribution deduction, under which a subsidy for
charitable giving would be available for itemizing and non-itemizing taxpayers
alike, may well fulfill this purpose.265
Faulhaber dismisses this idea out-of-hand based on the impact it would have on
the public treasury and reconciliation with the standard deduction’s purpose.266 From
a government revenue collection standpoint, the non-itemizer charitable
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contribution deduction is infeasible.267 Moreover, it is unclear whether the deduction
would lead to a corresponding uptick in charitable giving. Charitable giving springs
from several motivating factors, one of which may be tax, but pure altruism plays
its role as well. Many taxpayers who give to charity would give with or without a
corresponding tax deduction (actual or perceived).
Faulhaber’s intuition was confirmed in the early-1980s during the four years
leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.268 On an experimental basis, the nonitemizer charitable contribution deduction was phased in as a pilot program.269 It
culminated in 1986, a year in which all charitable donations were deductible,
itemizing or non-itemizing status notwithstanding.270
Though the non-itemizer charitable contribution deduction was nearly included
in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, it was ultimately abandoned in the spirit of
compromise.271 In a separate article, I consider the history of the non-itemizer
charitable contribution deduction and offer a modern-day assessment of its prospects
for reinstatement.272 In line with Faulhaber’s thoughts, I ultimately find that
concerns of economic necessity, fiscal viability, and measurable impact on the
charitable sector render the non-itemizer charitable contribution deduction an
imprudent tax subsidy.273 Data suggest that non-itemizers already give, and any
marginal incentivizing effect the non-itemizer charitable contribution may have to
267
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increase their charitable giving would pale in comparison to the government’s cost
for the subsidy.274
Faulhaber’s second proposal to curtail hypersalience is for the government to
initiate and sustain counterbalances to third-party marketers’ pitches relating to the
availability of the charitable contribution deduction.275 For example, the government
might start an ad campaign geared towards taxpayer education or awareness.276 The
campaign’s focus would be ostensibly to emphasize the limits of the charitable
contribution with an eye toward making the charitable contribution deduction
(together with its limiting features) fully or close to fully salient.
Faulhaber acknowledges two negative byproducts of such a campaign effort.
First, the government’s focus on the complexities of the tax system could lower
taxpayer morale.277 Second, the government’s ad campaign would announce that a
broadly popular tax provision is not only unavailable to most taxpayers but is
effectively reserved for itemizers who tend to be more affluent.278 Penalties for thirdparty marketers who mislead donors in their effort to drum up support for their
charity would suffer the same negative byproducts.
Faulhaber acknowledges that counterbalancing third-party charities’
promotional efforts and the goal of a completely salient charitable contribution
deduction are infeasible, yet her analysis implies at least two additional points that
contravene an affirmative government response to hypersalience. The first relates to
congressional intent: if hypersalience and its behavioral distortions were not
purposeful outcomes stemming from the imposition of limitations on the charitable
contribution deduction—in particular the standard deduction—then they are not
unwelcome. The standard deduction was intended to approximate a certain amount
of medical expenses, taxes paid, interest paid, and charitable giving. Available data
revealed that, on average, taxpayers with income below $5,000 gave 2.5% to charity,
paid 2.5% interest on personal debt, and paid taxes of 4% to 5% to other
governmental entities.279 The standard deduction was intended to be roughly equal
to 10% of average adjusted gross income.280 The rationale was that many taxpayers
would be in a better position with the standard deduction than with the sum of their
other deductions.
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The legislative history of the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944,281 which
promulgated the first iteration of the standard deduction, captures the concern of
some members of Congress with a presumptive deduction. They noted a free-rider
problem in the proposal. The taxpayer who would benefit most from the standard
deduction was the one who was on the underside of the average—the miser who did
not donate to charity, the fortunate one who did not pay taxes to any other taxing
agencies, who did not pay interest or incur medical bills during the year. These
taxpayers would receive “10 percent of the deduction to which they are not
entitled.”282 Meanwhile, those on the overside of the average who actually gave to
charity, paid taxes, interest, and incurred medical expenses, received the exact same
subsidy if the sum total of these expenses did not exceed the standard deduction
amount.283
In the end, these concerns were not strong enough to deter Congress from
passing the standard deduction into law, but the fact that Congress was aware of this
inequity is telling. It is reasonable to suggest that since Congress took no affirmative
steps to correct the overside of the average’s perception related to charitable giving,
Congress played a key role in the perpetuation of hypersalience from the standard
deduction’s initial iteration. For the government to then deploy resources, as
Faulhaber suggests, to correct this misapprehension would erode what may well
have been a happy byproduct of the standard deduction from the government’s
perspective: increased charitable giving with no actual tax subsidy.
On a second front, government penalties in response to aggressive fundraising
seem incompatible with the statutory rules for public charities. In order to maintain
their tax-exempt status, public charities must demonstrate that they rely on a certain
amount of public support.284 This requires concerted fundraising efforts. Failure to
demonstrate adequate public support leads to reclassification as a private foundation.
Bruce Hopkins notes the disadvantages of being classified as a private foundation
281
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“are several.”285 They include: (1) “the obligation to pay taxes on net investment
income”;286 (2) “the probable inability of the organization to be funded by other
private foundations”;287 (3) “a lesser degree of deductibility of charitable
contributions to the organization”;288 (4) the limitation on in-kind donations of
appreciated property related to valuation (confined to adjusted basis rather than fair
market value);289 and (5) additional compliance requirements with a “broad range of
onerous rules and limitations as to programs and investment policy.”290 All this
aside, if charities are more concerned with providing accurate tax information than
emphasizing why they are worthy of a potential donor’s gift, they will be less
effective as charities and run the risk of becoming inviable over time.
Faulhaber’s final point amounts to her recommendation to address
hypersalience: the government should limit statements made by private third-party
beneficiaries about tax-deductibility.291 Her rationale is that the government already
imposes many limitations on charities, and restricting their marketing efforts could
simply be another limitation.292
To implement this proposal, she renounces any wholesale prohibition on
marketing, which could reduce the portion of the deduction that is already salient, to
say nothing of the constitutional issues such a prohibition might ignite. Rather, she
calls for a circular 230293 approach. Under this approach, charities are encouraged to
be more accurate and forthright with respect to their marketing promises related to
tax benefits.294 To gauge the current landscape of charitable organization promotion,
Faulhaber conducted an informal survey of 500 randomly chosen charities and
examined their marketing pitches.295 Some included a caution to “consult with their
tax advisors.”296 Others qualified their promotional promises of tax benefits with the
codicil, to the “extent provided by law.”297 Most promotional materials, however,
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offered no guidance and suggested no possibility of limitations associated with the
actual deductibility of a charitable gift.298
Faulhaber predicts that this proposal would push the charitable contribution
deduction closer to full salience, as potential donors become more aware of the
associated limitations.299 To confirm the proposal’s viability, she notes that
McCaffery suggested a similar course of action in response to hidden taxes.300
Moreover, she finds her proposals consistent with general proposals that call for
“asymmetric paternalism,” which in this context stands for the idea that greater
information will not hurt those who are already aware of the charitable contribution
deduction; instead, it will likely change the knowledge level of those who are not
aware of such limits.301
Her final point of justification echoes a favorite refrain of behavioral
economists: “significant changes in behavior may be achieved through a simple
reframing of a situation.”302 Thus, little things such as requiring third-party
marketers acting on behalf of charities to couch references to the availability of tax
benefits with words like “may” or “might” or “possibly” go a long way; or
promotional materials that encourage donors to consult their tax adviser; or a
requirement that marketing materials refer explicitly to the fact that only a minority
of taxpayers will itemize their deductions.303 Faulhaber suggests that these small
adjustments may combine to correct the perception of at least some taxpayers, even
if not completely eliminating hypersalience.304 She ultimately finds this type of
proposal satisfying as it employs the parties whose actions have contributed to
hypersalience in its resolution.305
Faulhaber acknowledges certain limitations with her proposal—most notably
issues of free speech and increased monitoring costs for the government.306 She calls
for careful structuring of any future law that follows her proposal to avoid
constitutional concerns.307
Faulhaber’s proposal, of course, is anathema to the exploitation of
hypersalience. The case for exploiting hypersalience, however, may be strengthened
when Faulhaber’s proposal is subject to scrutiny. Such examination illustrates how
difficult it would be to unwind or mitigate hypersalience.
The essence of Faulhaber’s proposal calls on the government to tentatively
regulate the speech of charities with the promulgation of best practices and
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recommended promotional jargon.308 As discussed below, Faulhaber’s approach—
restrictive regulation of charities’ speech—is on precarious footing both from a
practical adherence perspective and from a constitutional standpoint.
1. Practical Adherence
It is somewhat aspirational to expect that mere nudges toward more carefully
tailored promotional language will elicit any meaningful responses from charities.
As noted above, charities rely on public support to remain viable and to maintain
their status as public charities. Without public support, the charity cannot fulfill its
charitable purpose. It is difficult enough, even with the effects of hypersalience
operating in the background, to find donors.309 Voluntary compliance with a system
that in any way creates the perception that donations to that charity might not be taxdeductible will be received coldly.
Consider the following hypothetical in light of circular 230-type guidance that
calls for charities to be clearer about the tax benefits flowing from charitable
donations. Charity A chooses to adhere to this policy. In all of its marketing
materials and pitches, it includes the following disclaimer: “Donations to Charity A
may be deductible. All donors should consult with their tax advisers to determine
whether their donations are deductible. Only a minority of taxpayers actually receive
a tax benefit from charitable giving.”310 Meanwhile, Charity B chooses not to adhere
to circular 230-type guidance and continues to call for charitable support with a
promise that “all donations to Charity B are tax deductible.” With all else equal,
potential donors with promotional materials from both charities in hand are more
likely to give to Charity B. They may even wonder why Charity A’s promise of tax
benefit is qualified. All this would almost certainly deter Charity A from continuing
in its efforts to increase donor awareness of the tax law related to charitable giving.
There is just too much at stake in the charities’ world to take that risk. In sum,
encouragement is not likely enough to compel charities to self-monitor their speech.
In all likelihood, only an across-the-board statutory declaration that requires
disclosure of the true nature of the charitable contribution deduction will
meaningfully mitigate hypersalience. Such an approach would level the playing field
between Charity A and Charity B, but would also push the bounds of the First
Amendment, as discussed in the next Section.311 Faulhaber’s proposal of
encouragement rather than blatant statutory regulation is sensitive to freedom of
speech concerns but is unlikely to move charities to action. In ironic contrast,
308
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statutory regulation that compels charities to action could amount to unconstitutional
burden on free speech.
2. Constitutional Concerns
A triumvirate of U.S. Supreme Court cases312 in the 1980s settled the modernday framework within which government regulation (in the form of prior
restraints,313 required disclosures, and compelled statements) of “charitable appeals”
are scrutinized. The first two cases set foundational principles.
In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment,314 the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down a municipal ordinance “prohibiting the solicitation of
contributions by charitable organizations that do not use at least 75 percent of their
receipts for ‘charitable purposes.’”315 In so doing, the Court made two critical
determinations related to “charitable appeals for funds.”316 First, it found that such
appeals are not “commercial speech,” a category of less-protected speech.317 Rather,
because they “involve a variety of speech interests—communication of information,
the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes,”
they are a form of fully-protected free speech under the First Amendment.318 As
such, regulation of solicitations for charitable financial support must be measured
“with due regard” for the reality that these types of solicitation are “characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for
particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues.”319
Second, and flowing from the finding that charitable appeals are entitled to full
First Amendment protection, the Court in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for
Better Environment applied its most rigorous form of judicial review, strict
scrutiny,320 to determine whether the ordinance violated the First Amendment. The
Court acknowledged the municipality’s interests in protecting its residents from
312
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“fraud, crime and undue annoyance,” but ultimately found them inadequate to
satisfy constitutional muster given the ordinance’s “direct and substantial limitation
on protected activity.”321
The second case, Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,322 involved a similar
prior restraint to the ordinance at issue in Schaumburg, but in Munson a Maryland
statute included a provision for waiver in circumstances where the percentage
limitation would “effectively prevent a charitable organization from raising
contributions.”323 Notwithstanding this flexibility, the Court found that the Maryland
statute imposed a “direct restriction on protected First Amendment activity” that
could not be justified under strict scrutiny.324 The Court also voiced concern that the
statute created “an unnecessary risk of chilling free speech.”325
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind,326 the culminating case in this line,
applied Schaumburg and Munson to a North Carolina statute that required disclosure
of certain information related to the percentage of raised funds that actually flowed
through to the charity from the professional fundraiser’s efforts.327 In its analysis,
the Court confirmed that required disclosure and compelled statements in connection
with charitable appeals, just as prior restraints, would be subject to the test for “fully
protected expression:” strict scrutiny.328 The Court went on to hold that compelling
statements of fact is a form of compulsion that burdens protected speech.329 It was
then North Carolina’s burden to show that the regulation was necessary to achieve
a compelling government purpose and that the statute was the least restrictive or
least discriminatory alternative to achieve that purpose.330
As a compelling government purpose, North Carolina cited the “importance of
informing donors how the money they contribute is spent in order to dispel the
alleged misperception that the money they give to the professional fundraisers goes
in greater-than-actual proportion to benefit charity.”331 The Court found that these
interests were not as weighty as the State argued and that the means to address them
were “unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored.”332
321
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The Court further highlighted particularly troublesome aspects of legislation
that require affirmative disclosure in general. It noted that even though “factual
information might be relevant to the listener . . . a law compelling its disclosure
would clearly and substantially burden the protected speech.”333 What is more,
“compelled disclosure will almost certainly hamper the legitimate efforts” to raise
money.334
These cases move the current narrative forward in two ways. First, they explain
the wisdom in Faulhaber’s circular 230-type approach. Encouraged disclosure,
rather than required disclosure, has surer footing under the First Amendment. Yet,
as discussed above, this type of regulatory nudge is unlikely to effectively resolve
hypersalience. Second, these cases provide a sequence of analyses to gauge federal
legislation that would compel charitable entities to disclose the likelihood of
deductibility in their charitable appeals.
Continuing the hypothetical from above, assume that Congress passes
legislation that compels all charities to make the following disclosure in their
charitable appeals: “Donations to Charity A may be deductible. All donors should
consult with their tax advisers to determine whether their donations are deductible.
Only a minority of taxpayers actually receive tax benefit from charitable giving.” At
the outset, under Schaumburg, charitable appeals are entitled to full protection under
the First Amendment from any burden this legislation may impose. Under Riley, that
protection extends to required disclosures and compelled statements such as these.
Does the resolution or mitigation of hypersalience in the context of the
charitable contribution deduction rise to the level of a compelling (or vital)
government purpose? To be sure, taxpayer education and awareness are worthwhile
endeavors. The more Congress and the IRS can work in concert to better inform
taxpayers with respect to the tax ramifications of their decisions, the better. Yet,
hypersalience-induced taxpayer error is not necessarily the result of either
Congress’s or the IRS’s failure to educate. Information on the interplay between the
charitable contribution deduction and the standard deduction is available to
taxpayers who choose to avail themselves of it on the IRS’s website. A
misunderstanding occurs because taxpayers fall into the cognitive trap of assuming
that awareness of the charitable contribution deduction connotes full understanding
without further investigation.
In Riley, North Carolina’s interest in promulgating its statute was to inform
donors and “dispel the alleged misperception.”335 The lack of awareness in North
Carolina related to professional fundraisers and their proportional share of
donations. This is analogous to concerns related to hypersalience. Corrective
legislation to address hypersalience would inform taxpayers regarding the true
nature of the charitable contribution deduction and thereby dispel their
misperception. In Riley, this purpose was held “not as weighty as the State asserts”336
333
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and was not considered compelling or vital. It seems reasonable to conclude that the
government’s interest in unwinding hypersalience would similarly not rise to the
level of a compelling government purpose.
Even if resolution of cognitive error associated with hypersalience, however,
were considered a compelling government purpose, the government would likely
struggle to show that compelled statements and required disclosures are the least
restrictive means to achieve that purpose. Throughout the Schaumburg-MunsonRiley line of cases, the Court found less intrusive ways to achieve the government’s
purpose without burdening speech. In Schaumburg, the Court suggested that the
municipality’s interest in preventing fraud could be addressed with “penal laws used
to punish such conduct directly.”337 In Munson, the Court found the means chosen
to accomplish Maryland’s objective to prevent fraud was too imprecise and created
an unnecessary risk of chilling free speech.338 In Riley, North Carolina’s statute was
unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored.339 The Court was particularly
concerned about the hampering effect required disclosure would have on legitimate
efforts to raise money.
In terms of the required disclosures proposed here, Faulhaber’s first two
suggestions to unwind hypersalience provide ready examples of less restrictive
alternatives that would not burden free speech. Congress could appropriate funds to
create public awareness that most charitable donations are not tax-deductible—
something akin to a public service announcement. Alternatively, Congress could
cure hypersalience if it allowed all non-itemizers to deduct their charitable
contributions. These approaches, even though not viable for reasons Faulhaber
acknowledges above, are nevertheless available to unwind hypersalience without
burdening or chilling speech, or otherwise hampering a charity’s legitimate efforts
to raise money.
3. Current Regulation for Charities and Analysis
Consider all this in light of the fact that a critical mass of charities already
deploys significant resources to ensure compliance with the tax law. Charities must
file an annual Form 990 that, depending on the size of the charity, may require
substantial disclosures regarding donors, income, and expenses, among other data.340
This requires careful record keeping and potentially a significant amount of
resources. In the end, it seems that few charities would have additional bandwidth
or capacity to correct misunderstandings of the tax law—especially when such
actions may deter potential donors from giving.
Even then, and perhaps more relevant given Faulhaber’s proposal, charities’
speech is already subject to restrictions. For example, charities are restricted from
337
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intervening, either in favor of or in opposition to, political campaigns for public
office.341 Some consider this to be an unconstitutional burden on free speech.342
Additional regulation that affects the speech of charities would likely draw similar
ire.
In the end, the question of whether to correct hypersalience or exploit it from a
market salience perspective may come down to balancing. Consider the costs and
benefits associated with curtailment of hypersalience. The benefits include a more
literate and correctly-informed tax base with respect to charitable giving. Taxpayers
would have full awareness of the tax ramifications of their charitable giving. The
costs include potentially unconstitutional burdens on free speech, more onerous
compliance burdens on the already heavily-regulated charities sector, curtailed
charitable giving leaving charities less able to fulfill their charitable purposes, and
the government on the hook to make up the shortfall. As a whole, the benefits from
curtailing hypersalience do not seem to offset the associated costs.
Exploiting hypersalience by maintaining the status quo leaves the benefits that
Faulhaber’s proposal promises untapped. Taxpayers generally remain unaware of
the limitations associated with charitable giving. They walk down a misinformed
path that, in spite of their perception, leads to no real tax benefit. Yet the offsetting
benefits are still substantial. Taxpayers may give more to charity than they would
have otherwise. In at least some circumstances, as explored above, this reallocation
of earmarked funds for a “greater cause” may lead to zero individual utility loss.
Moreover, charities are on firmer footing to fulfill their charitable purposes. In turn,
the government does not have to fill in the charitable sector’s underfunded gap. A
reasonable argument can be made that these benefits justify an exploitation of the
American taxpayer’s cognitive error.
This argument is further bolstered when considered in light of the TCJA, which
with its augmented standard deduction, widens the gap between charitable giving
and realizable tax benefit. The American Enterprise Institute predicts that the TCJA
will reduce household charitable giving by $17.2 billion in 2018 alone.343 It
estimates that four-fifths of this decline will be driven by an increase in the number
of taxpayers who claim the standard deduction. All this suggests that, in light of tax
reform, charities need all the help they can get. If that help comes as taxpayers
misperceive the current tax laws and give more to charity, so be it.344 If it comes in
2026 (or even sooner if a Democrat-controlled Congress unwinds relevant parts of
341
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the TCJA), when hypersalience is retrenched within the American taxpayer’s
cognitive biases, this Article asserts that Congress should let hypersalience run its
course. The benefits of hypersalience are too great relative to the costs of its
curtailment.
B. Political Salience
Political salience, just as economic or market salience, deals with public
awareness—for purposes of this discussion, public awareness of government action
giving rise to the tax law. The primary distinction between the two versions of
salience, as described above in Part IV, Section A, is the direction in which the
public response is measured. Market salience measures public awareness and
corresponding behavioral response to government action as measured in the market.
Political salience measures public awareness and corresponding behavioral response
to government action as registered through the political process.345 In the tax context,
political salience gauges the political response to the adoption of a tax or tax
provision. Schenk extrapolates from empirical work on salience to suggest that
political response to various tax provisions should vary with their salience. Thus,
low-salience taxes will garner less political response than high salience taxes.
As noted above, Schenk justifies the exploitation of political salience with two
fundamental political constructs: (1) the state has the power to levy taxes; and (2)
the state has an appropriate need for revenue.346 If these statements are true, then it
is proper for the state to choose a form of taxation that is most palatable to its
citizens.
Consider Schenk’s constructs recrafted in light of revenue-reducing tax
provisions like the charitable contribution deduction: (1) the state has the power to
wield tax incentives; and (2) the state has an appropriate need to ensure that charities
are adequately funded to fulfill their charitable purposes. If these statements are true,
then it is proper for the state to create a tax incentive that will create the broadest
level of charitable giving.
The citizenry generally wants public goods and revenues to increase, but
without a simultaneous increase in taxes. In contrast, and more realistically, the
citizenry generally acknowledges the role that charities play in society and expects
the government to provide some sort of subsidy to that end. Thus, a tax benefit for
charitable giving is generally accepted as sound tax policy.347
Schenk justifies her framework as an instrumentalist argument: that exploiting
political salience bias may achieve an important end—the generation of revenues
for the federal government with the least psychological pain.348 A similar
345
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instrumentalist argument might be made here: exploiting hypersalience achieves the
important end of maximizing charitable giving, all while maximizing psychological
gain. Taxpayers do not seem to operate with the same aversion to losses when giving
to charity. Charitable giving is laudable and aspirational. Altruism plays its role, and
when taxpayers “lose money” by donating to charity it is not the same as losing
money by paying taxes. They experience the psychological benefits of giving to
charity—sometimes called the “warm glow” effect.349 This effect is enhanced by the
perception that tax liability is reduced, thus creating the optimal circumstance for
the taxpayer’s psychological gain.
In counterpoint, an effort to unwind hypersalience would take a psychological
toll on taxpayers. If the charitable contribution deduction were fully salient, such
that taxpayers were fully aware that their charitable giving might go without the
government’s approbation in the form of a tax deduction, not only would taxpayers
be less inclined to give, purely altruistic giving would be tainted. The warm glow
would dim. Taxpayers might wonder why Congress only feels inclined to provide
tax benefits in response to charitable giving for the relative few who itemize and
tend to be more affluent.
Schenk places certain preconditions on Congress’s exploitation of political
salience. What follows is a correlative analysis that measures the extent to which the
exploitation of hypersalience can be justified on similar or analogous grounds. This
analysis suggests that the government is already exploiting hypersalience from a
political perspective. Thus, the argument here is one that calls for maintenance of
the status quo: the limitations associated with the actual charitable contribution
deduction serve meaningful purposes in the context of generating public support for
charity and providing the government’s tacit approval for philanthropic activity.
1. Schenk’s Framework
The culmination of Schenk’s paper is that the politics of taxation make it
impossible for Congress to raise tax rates directly, even while additional revenue is
needed to fund government activities.350 In this political climate, it is appropriate
and justifiable for Congress to consider and adopt low-salience taxes to overcome
the political-economy of the tax legislation problem.351 This justification comes in
three components related to the general concepts of: loss aversion, budget deficits,
and political rhetoric.
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(a) Loss Aversion
Though it generally operates in the subconscious, as noted above, the basic
human aversion to losses is strong and well-documented.352 Schenk posits that the
disutility from paying taxes is even greater than the general aversion associated with
other types of losses.353 For example, semantics matter here: calling a forced
payment a fee rather than a tax quells the negative reaction that is commonly
associated with paying taxes.354 Schenk uses the amplified loss aversion bias to
justify the use of low salience taxes.
The loss aversion principle relates differently to the charitable contribution
deduction and hypersalience. Nearly since the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment, some iteration of the charitable contribution deduction has been a
factor in the tax formula.355 It might not be too hyperbolic to suggest that this is a
fundamental tax deduction. This, in part, is the reason that the deduction is
hypersalient: its existence, or the general awareness that tax benefit follows
charitable giving, is taken for granted within the mindset of the American taxpayer.
Unwinding hypersalience is cognitively akin to rescinding the tax deduction for
charitable giving. If taxpayers become broadly aware of the limitations associated
with the charitable contribution deduction and that for a majority of taxpayers,
charitable giving serves only an altruistic end, they will feel as if something that was
once theirs has been taken away. This, in some ways, would feel like a new and very
salient tax that would expend political capital that could otherwise be used to
actually increase taxes to fund government activities.
(b) Budget Deficits
Schenk considers the budget crisis in which the United States operates as a
second justification for exploiting low-salience taxes—reasoning that rings even
truer with the promulgation of the TCJA, which according to Congressional Budget
Office estimates, will increase the budget deficit by around $12 trillion.356
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This justification could be a subset to or consequence of the tax aversion
concept. As noted above, once a government program is in place, it is hard to take
away. The second solution, raising revenue, generally faces bleak prospects in light
of the citizenry’s general and strong aversion to tax increases. Schenk elaborates on
and explains this conundrum and goes as far as to suggest that the current political
climate makes it impossible to increase rates or expand the base in a direct and
salient way.
In line with a low-salient tax provision that raises revenue, the charitable
contribution deduction’s hypersalient feature gives rise to charitable giving that has
no fiscal note357 and does not impede revenue raising. That is, the rationale for
Congress’s affirmative use of low-salience taxes applies with equal force to the
exploitation of hypersalience in the context of the charitable contribution deduction.
Congress needs to raise revenue. It also has an interest in the viability of charities.
In general proportion to the charitable sector’s shortfall, the government must either
fund the difference or let the charitable activity go unfulfilled. To the extent
hypersalience compels charitable giving without having to actually follow-through
with the corresponding tax subsidy, revenue-raising occurs and charities are
funded—two outcomes that would be mutually exclusive but for hypersalience.
Given the calamitous tone of predicted government shortfalls, and the unlikely
prospects of cutting spending and raising revenue, play on taxpayers’ cognitive
biases is warranted.
To apply Schenk’s point related to the government’s financial solvency
analogously, many charities are not on the firmest of financial footings. Unlike the
federal government, charities cannot run budget deficits in near perpetuity and
remain viable. To compound things, the TCJA has undermined charitable
fundraising and set charities up to struggle for the near future. Organizational
spending cuts are viable prospects, but charities tend to run lean (especially those
that rely on broad-based volunteer efforts) and it seems they would not have the
wherewithal to absorb spending cuts. Operating under the TCJA, it would not be
unreasonable for Congress to leave whatever hypersalience grows in the interim
uncorrected.
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(c) Political Rhetoric and the Impossibility of Raising Taxes Directly
Schenk considers four ways in which political rhetoric serves as a barrier to the
raising of taxes.358 The fourth—that the poisonous atmosphere with respect to taxes
prevents increasing taxes directly—is examined here.359 This factor relates to and
informs the question of political capital and the wisdom of unwinding hypersalience.
Schenk’s premise is that political rhetoric makes it impossible to discuss taxes
publicly in a direct and salient way.360 She attributes this toxic atmosphere to two
factors: (1) the obsession with marginal tax rates; and (2) the political impossibility
of adopting any legislation that could be framed as raising taxes.361 Her first point is
a consequence of the high-salience/low-salience dynamic. Politicians and citizens
alike tend to latch on to elements of the tax law that readily distill to political talking
points. The tax rates outside the context of the tax rate brackets provide a ready
example. Schenk notes that this clinging to the most salient elements of the tax law
and using them as political devices to manipulate the voting public’s perception as
it relates to the tax rates has effectively muffled any conversation of raising revenue
through changes in the tax brackets.362
To the second factor, the mere suggestion that proposed legislation could raise
taxes is an effective death knell. A recent example provides confirmation. The
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013363 was intended to respond to the online sales and
use tax conundrum. Subject to certain limitations for small businesses, online
retailers would be required to collect sales and use taxes on online purchases.364 In
turn, the States would be subject to certain simplification and uniformity measures.
This would have been a response to the Supreme Court’s invitation decades earlier
for Congress to provide some sort of regulation in the context of remote sales and
the collection of sales and use tax.365 Even though this legislation was a federal
mechanism by which states would collect state-level sales and use taxes, it was
portrayed in certain circles as a “new,” “national online sales tax.”366 The bill
358
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failed,367 ostensibly in part, because politicians had no interest in running for
reelection having voted for a “national online sales tax.”
All this is to suggest that political capital, as it relates to tax increases, is
precious: it will cost a substantial amount to increase taxes even slightly. The
political cost diminishes, and feasibility increases, when the salience of the tax
increase decreases. This is the crux of Schenk’s contention for the exploitation of
low-salience taxes.
The question of undoing hypersalience then, to some extent, is a question of
whether Congress can afford to use up the associated political capital. If the
charitable contribution deduction were to become fully salient, it could easily be
perceived as a tax increase. After all, a deduction that taxpayers previously perceived
was theirs, will feel as if it has been rescinded. Such a perceived increase in taxes
would use up political capital and the limited (if any) political tolerance taxpayers
have for tax increases. To make the idea even more politically untenable, this would
all occur without realizing any corresponding benefit in the form of increased
revenues.
2. Schenk’s Recommendation
Schenk’s paper concludes with a summary of the circumstances in which it is
appropriate for Congress to consider the use of low-salience taxes. A conclusion of
the discussion of political salience in the context of hypersalience and the charitable
contribution deduction is offered here in parallel analyses.
Schenk contends that there are situations where low-salience taxes may enable
the government to achieve otherwise worthy goals, subject to certain conditions: (1)
the process must be reasonably transparent; and (2) information with respect to the
low-salience tax provision must be readily available.368 Similarly, there are
situations where hypersalient tax deductions may enable (or at least enhance) the
government’s ability to achieve otherwise worthy goals. In the context of the
charitable contribution deduction, hypersalience compels taxpayers to give more to
charity. Consistent with Schenk’s conditions, the process through which the
charitable contribution deduction was promulgated, together with the standard
deduction, was reasonably transparent. A simple Google search will provide more
information as to the history of these two provisions than most taxpayers would ever
need to become aware of the associated limitations. Moreover, information with
respect to the interplay of the standard deduction and the itemized deductions is
available on the IRS’s website.369
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Schenk’s conclusion is that if these conditions are satisfied, there is no
convincing argument that it would be wrong for the government to take error into
account by effectively using politically pleasing taxes or provisions.370 She notes
that salience is exogenous.371 That is, it is caused by external forces or factors outside
the tax provision, namely the inability or unwillingness of taxpayers to engage
System 2 and fully understand or react to given provisions. Thus, an attempt to
minimize the perceived burden of tax is not wrong per se.372
In like fashion, why should the government go out of its way to correct any
cognitive error connected to hypersalience, when the result is increased charitable
giving with no corresponding decrease in tax revenues? Hypersalience is also
exogenous because it is caused by the external third parties that Faulhaber
described.373 Taxpayers rely on System 1 to perceive the tax deduction but could
engage System 2 and properly understand the associated limitations, as the
information is readily available.374 That cognitive tendencies compel them not to
explore the ins-and-outs of the charitable contribution deduction requires no
corrective action from Congress.
Schenk notes that the politics of taxation are a good illustration of when
exploiting the cognitive bias in favor of low-salience taxes would be effective and
appropriate.375 Similarly, the system in which we operate, under which the federal
government has outsourced critical societal functions and responsibilities to
charities, creates an ideal atmosphere for exploiting cognitive bias in favor of any
hypersalience connected to the charitable contribution deduction.
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
This discussion culminates with a policy recommendation of congressional
restraint in the face of hypersalience. There are cogent arguments from both market
and political salience perspectives that Congress should not intervene to correct the
cognitive error that may be attributable to hypersalience.
A. Market Salience
In the context of market salience, when balancing the costs associated with
curtailment relative to the benefits of leaving hypersalience intact, the benefits of
leaving hypersalience intact seem to prevail. Concerns of curtailment include the
prospects of unconstitutional burdens on speech, overregulation, and an overall less
viable charities sector. Meanwhile, exploitation of taxpayer cognitive bias can be
370
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justified in that it compels taxpayers to give, including in circumstances that would
lead to zero utility loss, thus improving the charitable sector’s viability. In
corresponding measure, the government is relieved of either making up any shortfall
or leaving the charitable effort undone.
B. Political Salience
From a political salience perspective, exploitation of hypersalience is
justifiable. Taxpayers generally experience a warm glow effect when they give to
charity. The perception that tax benefit flows from charitable giving only works to
enhance that effect. Moreover, the heuristic of loss aversion would engage if
Congress undertook measures to mitigate or remedy hypersalience. Thus, if
hypersalience were corrected, it would be tantamount to a new tax (or at least the
denial of perceived tax benefit). In an era of political polarization and massive
deficits, Congress can ill afford to expend constrained and precious political capital
in this way. It is simply too hard to increase taxes to expend political capital,
unwinding taxpayer cognitive bias.
This reasoning falls in line with Schenk’s precursors to the exploitation of
hidden taxes: transparent processes and readily available information. Taxpayers,
should they choose to do so, can find a wealth of information on the charitable
contribution deduction. The information is there for the taking. Taxpayers, in
general, are cognitively unwilling—they will rely on System 1 as long as possible
before engaging System 2. Congress should not spend political capital in an attempt
to make the charitable contribution deduction a System 1 problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
The standard deduction and its mutually exclusive relationship to tax benefited
charitable giving enjoyed a moment in the spotlight during the lead up to the TCJA.
This spotlight has moved to other subjects, and with time, the preexisting general
awareness of the charitable contribution deduction will likely survive, while its
limitations, including its status relative to non-itemizers, will fade. Awareness, after
all, requires reinforcement.
It is just as reasonable to expect that the TCJA’s days are limited (politically or
statutorily)—at least as compared to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The TCJA was
rammed through Congress on a starkly partisan vote, which all but ensures the tax
law will undergo substantial reform sooner rather than later, as Democrats respond
with their own tax legislation or provisions expire by statute.376
As this occurs, the charitable contribution deduction may take on an even more
hypersalient status as the media and charities alike proclaim its revival—creating
the impression that more taxpayers will now be able to deduct their charitable giving.
This Article recommends that Congress should refrain from correcting any existing
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or ensuing cognitive bias associated with the deductibility of charitable giving. The
costs of correction—including potentially unconstitutional burdens on free speech,
more onerous compliance burdens on the already heavily-regulated charities sector,
and curtailed charitable giving leaving charities less able to fulfill their charitable
purposes—are too high to correct from a market salience perspective, and the
political capital expended is too great from a political salience perspective to do
otherwise.

